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I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery is a transaction in which an official misuses his or her office
"as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be
monetary."' In a legal sense, this general concept is articulated in specific
statutes. The Navajo Nation Code, for example, prohibits the conferral of
"any benefit upon a Tribal official, Tribal judge or employee with the
intention of influencing such person's vote, opinion, judgment, exercise of
discretion or other action in his or her capacity as a Tribal official, Tribal
judge or employee." 2 Halfway around the world geographically-and even
farther culturally-Saudi Arabian law deems a bribe to have occurred when
an official "has solicited for himself or a third party, or accepted or received
a promise or a gift to perform any duties of his function."' Completing the
circle geographically, but even farther still culturally, the United States
defines bribery as the giving "of anything of value to any public official...
with intent to influence any official act" or to cause the official "to do any
act in violation of the lawful duty of such official or person.' The statutes
of the Navajo Nation, Saudi Arabia, and the United States do not exhaust the
list of statutes criminalizing bribery-every country in the world prohibits
the bribery of its own officials.'
The most recent efforts to contain bribery, however, have been
multilateral. A number of international organizations have coordinated
among or required of their members the criminalization of a specific type of
bribery-transnational bribery.6 Transnational bribery occurs when persons
from one country bribe public officials of another country.
Prohibition of transnational bribery is also accomplished through
specific statutory measures. A hypothetical statute would first set out the
parameters of the conduct it intends to regulate. The statute would state that
1. David H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 W. POL. Q.
719, 720 (1966); see also Bryan W. Husted, Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation
of Corruption in Third-World Countries, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 17, 18-19 (1994) (describing bribery in
transaction terms); cf. J.S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 417, 419 & n.10 (1967) (defining corruption as "behavior which deviates from
the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique)
pecuniary or status gains").
2. NATION CODE tit. 17, § 360(A)(1) (Equity 1995). Punishment for bribery of Tribal
officials may include both prison and fines. Id. § 360(B). A Tribal official who accepts bribes may
also be removed from office. Id. § 365.
3. Combatting Bribery Law, Official Gazette No. 3414, art. 1 (July 31, 1992) (Saudi
Arabia), reprinted in 9 ARAB L.Q. 283, 283 (1994). Bribery is punishable by imprisonment and fine.
See id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
5. See FRTz F. HEIMANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 2 (1994).
6. The Organization of American States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development have undertaken the most comprehensive efforts, which are discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 50-65.
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it applies only to its own citizens or residents (or their agents, officers, or
employees), and that it regulates only the conferral of benefits on a foreign
official for the purpose of causing that official to misuse his or her office.
Within the pan-cultural concept of bribery, however, specific laws may
differ.7 Therefore, the hypothetical statute would go on to state that it
criminalizes only that conduct which is illegal in the country to which the
foreign officials belong. The extraterritorial nature of the criminalization of
transnational bribery therefore operates in two directions: the courts of the
businessperson's home country reach conduct that occurs outside of the
home country's physical borders, and the laws of the bribed official's
country are given effect in courts outside of the borders of the host country. 8
The fact that the prevailing climate favors the criminalization of
transnational bribery does not in and of itself mean that such a policy
decision is correct.9 This Article participates in an ongoing debate
concerning both the viability and desirability of a policy choice prohibiting
transnational bribery. The Article concludes that, given the current global
conditions, criminalization of transnational bribery is not only viable and
desirable, but also moral.
At the outset, however, it is important to clarify what a debate about
prohibiting transnational bribery is not about. First, such a debate is not
about the viability or desirability of the United States's Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which at one time was the only law in the world that
effectively prohibited transnational bribery. The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act is one example of the types of legislation that could be used to effectuate
a prohibition, but it is the prohibition itself, not the legislation, that is at
issue. Second, the debate is not about whether criminalization is the only
action that is necessary. Effective policing of transnational bribery will
require a number of policies, ranging from transparent decision-making in
host countries to voluntary codes of corporate conduct.1
7. The difference is not necessarily great. This Article; is not intended as a compilation of
the statutes condemning bribery throughout the world. A project of that sort was undertaken by the
U.S. Library of Congress in 1976. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A COMPILATION OF BRIBERY AND
EXTORTION LAWS IN OPIC CouNTRIEs (1976). Although some of the statutes undoubtedly have been
rewritten, the compilation is very interesting, not least for the degree of similarity among the statutes.
8. For the sake of clarity, this Article will borrow terminology commonly used to describe
foreign investment. "Home country" will refer to the country of the private business party, while
"host country" will refer to the country in which the business activity occurs.
9. Steven Salbu, for example, has argued against the viability of the United States's
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which criminalizes transnational bribery. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery
in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
Rnv. 229 (1997).
10. See Fritz F. Heimann, Combatting International Corruption: The Role of the Business
Community, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 147, 148 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997)
(discussing the number of policies required to combat international corruption).
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Finally, this debate is not about a simple economic transaction. As
Martin Davies forcefully put it, "We delude ourselves if we think bribery to
be purely economic conduct incapable of leading to fear, cruelty and
humiliation."" 1 Although it may appear worldly to adopt a cynical attitude
with respect to bribery, the human face of the practice must not be
forgotten.
This Article's conclusion-that practical and moral considerations
require prohibition of transnational bribery-stems from the anomaly of
current global conditions. As part of a process called globalization,
economic relationships increasingly involve persons in more than one
polity. 2 At the same time, as part of a process called fragmentation,
lawmaking is becoming more localized.' 3 Thus, the economic communities
created through globalization do not enjoy the support of institutions
normally associated with economic activity. Such institutions-including
law-must be cobbled together from the institutions of various countries. 1
4
This Article analyzes transnational bribery in the context of the above-
described anomaly. In particular, this Article examines the growth in and
harms attendant to transnational bribery.' 5 The Article then evaluates
alternatives to home country prohibitions, and determines that these
alternatives alone are insufficient.'6 Finally, this Article evaluates arguments
against prohibitions of transnational bribery, and determines that these
arguments do not detract from the attractiveness of such laws as a policy
choice under current global conditions. 7
II. CONDITIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MILLENNIUM:
GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION
At least two concepts are embraced by a number of theoretical
disciplines as descriptive of global conditions at the turn of the millennium:
globalization and fragmentation. 8 Although precise definitions vary among
schools of thought,' 9 globalization usually refers to economic and
11. Martin Davies, Just (Don't) Do It: Ethics and International Trade, 21 MEL. U. L.
REv. 601, 614 (1997).
12. See infra Section ll.A.
13. See infra Section H.B.
14. See infra Section H.C.
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1997) ("M[Tihere is pervasive resort to the twin themes of globalization
and fragmentation in a wide variety of literature."); Boutros-Boutros Ghali [sic], 50th Anniversary of
the United Nations, VrrAL SPEECHES, Nov. 15, 1995, at 66 (stating that globalization and
fragmentation are the two great forces that will shape the world in the 21st century).
19. See ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 8-
32 (1992) (discussing the disagreements over the definition of globalization).
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commercial integration. Fragmentation, on the other hand, generally refers
to political devolution. These two concepts set the stage for a discussion of
home country criminalization of transnational bribery.
A. Globalization
Globalization is perceived by many to be the most powerful force
shaping the world as it enters the twenty-first century.20 While the concept of
globalization is somewhat amorphous," the most narrow and often used
meaning of the term globalization is economic globalization.22 Jeffrey Sachs
posits that globalization occurs along four paths: trade, finance, production,
and a growing web of economic treaties and institutions.23 Similarly,
Stephen Kobrin suggests that globalization consists of deep economic
20. See, e.g., Barbara Fliess & Anthony Kleitz, Trade Policy in 2000, OECD OBSERVER,
Apr.-May 1998, at 7 ("Perhaps the most commented-on feature of the international economy during
the last two decades has been the accelerated globalization of production and markets."); Alex Y.
Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 429 (1997)
("Globalization is one of the great forces shaping the world today."); see also Laura B. Pincus et al.,
Legal Issues Involved in Corporate Globalization, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 269, 269 (noting "the
unmistakable trend towards superregionalism and globalized market economies").
21. Roland Robertson, for example, argues that globalization consists of a shift from
predominantly local consciousness to a consciousness that includes a global orientation. See
ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 113; see also CLARK, supra note 18, at 16 (suggesting that the fact that
globalization involves conscious perspective causes the concept to be both pervasive throughout
various disciplines and difficult to define). Anthony Giddens, on the other hand, speaks of
globalization as the technological compression of time and space and the concomitant lifting of
relationships from the local context. See ANTHONY GDDENS, CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 21
(1990).
22. See CLARK, supra note 18, at 21 ("The vast majority of globalization theorists present it
as a characteristic of economic activity."). For examples from a variety of disciplines, see Daniel
Drezner, Globalizers of the World, Unite!, WASH. Q., Winter 1998, at 209, 212 (discussing the role
of nation-states within the economic logic of globalization); Roger Hayter & Sun Sheng Han,
Reflections on China's Open Door Policy Towards Foreign Investment, 32 REGIONAL STuD. 1 (1998)
(attributing China's economic policies in part to economic globalization); Richard C. Jones,
Remittances and Inequality: A Question of Migration Stage and Geographic Scale, 74 ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 8 (1998) (discussing economic globalization's effect on transnational wage earners); and
S.M. Roberts, What About the Children?, 30 ENV'T & PLAN. 3 (1998) (examining the role of children
in economic globalization). The pervasiveness of an economic definition of globalization is also
evidenced in a variety of non-scholarly venues, ranging from Mother Jones magazine to the speeches
of the Pontiff of the Catholic Church. See Jeffrey Klein, As the World Turns, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-
Apr. 1998, at 3, 3 ("[M]ost of us know that economic globalization will affect our lives whether or
not we buy more foreign stuff or even pay attention."); Pope, In Message, Urges a Just
Globalization, N.Y. Timns, Jan. 2, 1998, at A6 (reporting statement of the Pontiff that peace should
accompany economic globalization).
23. See Jeffrey Sachs, Interlocking Economies: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 97, 98.
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integration.' The majority of legal scholarship also describes globalization
as primarily an economic phenomenon."
The benefits of economic globalization are clear.26 David Ricardo's
theory of comparative advantage predicts that international trade will allow
countries to specialize in the production of goods and services that they are
the most efficient at producing: countries do not need to produce goods or
services that they are less efficient at producing because they can purchase
those goods and services from other countries.2 The channeling of resources
to their most efficient uses results in greater wealth for all trading
countries. This phenomenon underlies the predictions for increased global
wealth that accompanied the trade liberalization introduced by the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, predictions that ranged from 212
billion U.S. dollars per year to over 274 billion U.S. dollars per year
starting in the year 2002.29 If, as the economic definitions of globalization
24. See Stephen Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked
Global Economy, in GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 146, 148 (John
H. Dunning ed., 1997).
25. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for International Development, 32 Tix.
INT'L L.J. 209, 213 (1997) (noting that "every major structure of power in the world economy has
become increasingly globalized"); Richard A. Grasso, Globalization of the Equity Markets, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1108, 1114 (1997) (discussing the "dawn of equity globalization"); Miguel de Ia
Madrid, National Sovereignty and Globalization, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 553, 555-57 (1997)
(discussing economic globalization); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between
European and American Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
833, 846 (1998) (discussing financial globalization). Hector Fix-Fierro and Sergio Lopez-Allyan
suggest that traditional jurisprudential thought is ill-prepared to deal with the broad concept of
globalization because traditional jurisprudence was formed within the concept of the nation-state
system. See Hector Fix-Fierro & Sergio Lopez-Allyan, The Impact of Globalization on the Reform of
the State and Law in Latin America, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 785, 786 (1997). Seita recognizes a number
of transnational relationships that comprise globalization but posits that the primary aspect of the
phenomenon is economic. See Seita, supra note 20, at 429.
26. But not undisputed. See Sachs, supra note 23, at 97-98 (noting that skeptics suggest that
the linking of rich and poor countries through globalization will increase inequality in the rich
countries and will cause dislocation in the poor countries).
27. See FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 38 (7th ed. 1994)
(explicating the theory of comparative advantage); Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An
Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 199 (1989) (discussing the theory of comparative
advantage); see also Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion
Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 315, 318-19 (1993) ("No
economic theory of trade has been more dominant in the last two centuries than David Ricardo's
theory of comparative advantage.").
28. See ROOT, supra note 27, at 38; see also EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 358 (7th ed. 1992) (discussing wealth creation through international trade).
29. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 1994, at
86-87 (1994) (summarizing four different studies on the predicted increase in global wealth that would
be caused by increased trade due to trade liberalization introduced by the Uruguay Round); see also
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992) (stating that "the basic policy underlying" the world trading system
is "to pursue the benefits described in economic theory as 'comparative advantage'").
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suggest, globalization does increase transnational trade, then Ricardo's
theory suggests an increase in global wealth.
A simple increase in global wealth is not the only benefit of economic
globalization. An increase in transnational trade will increase the amount and
variety of goods and services available to consumers." Transnational
commerce accelerates the diffusion of knowledge and technical innovation;
accelerating trade will accelerate the pace of the world's technological
growth.31 Moreover, while the reasons are debated, there is an observable
link between trade and economic development.3' Globalization should bring
more developing countries into the network of global commerce and thus
hasten the growth of their economies.
Finally, economic relations also have beneficial political effects.
"Countries that trade with each other are less likely to go to war than are
countries that erect trade barriers to prevent foreign goods from crossing
their borders. "3 The relationship between transnational commerce and peace
has been observed by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant,34 Charles
Montesquieu, 35 and John Stuart Mill.
36
By consensus, globalization is one of the most powerful forces
affecting the world and one of the most accurate descriptions of conditions at
the close of the millennium. Globalization suggests that commercial
transactions are more and more likely to include parties from more than one
country. Economic globalization offers many benefits, ranging from
30. See JUNICHI GOTO, LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
JAPANESE-AMERICAN ISSUES 82 (1990) (summarizing empirical and theoretical work supporting the
conclusion that international trade increases the availability of consumer goods).
31. Cf. Anne 0. Krueger, Trade Policy as an Input to Development, AM. EcoN. REv., May
1980, at 288, 289-90 (explaining how, due to technological factors, export promotion may spur
growth in less developed countries).
32. See James Riedel, Trade as an Engine of Growth: Theory and Evidence, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 25, 26-29 (David Greenaway ed., 1988) (discussing both
the "supply-oriented" school of thought, which argues that trade allows developing countries to
acquire foreign reserves that can be used to purchase technology that will make labor more
productive, and the "demand-oriented" school of thought, which argues that trade allows developing
countries to absorb surplus labor and thus break the cycle of poverty). Strict neoclassical theory
suggests that trade permits developing countries to be more efficient, allowing them to accumulate
savings that can be invested in development. See id. at 26-27.
33. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with
Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 551
(1993).
34. See IMMANUEL KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Search, in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER EsSAYS 107, 125 (Ted Humphreys trans., Hackett Publishing 1983) (1795) ("The
spirit of trade cannot coexist with war.").
35. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56 (1987)
(quoting Montesquieu's statement that "peace is the natural effect of trade").
36. See JOHN STUART MILL, Principles of Political Economy, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL 594 (John M. Robson ed., 1965) (1884) (stating that trade is "the principal
guarantee of the peace of the world").
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increased global wealth to greater standards of living and the possibility of
real global peace.
B. Fragmentation
The other dominant description of extant conditions,
"fragmentation," 37 stands in sharp contradistinction to globalization.
"Fragmentation" refers to the devolution of decision-making to the local
level." Fragmentation is linked to globalization, although political and social
scientists debate the exact nature of the link, suggesting that fragmentation
may be an anachronism that survives globalization, a dialectical reaction to
globalization, or a complementary aspect of the same phenomenon as
globalization.39
37. See Ghali, supra note 18, at 66 (characterizing fragmentation as one of the dominant
forces in the world); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1021 (1997) ("[Tlhe
major characteristic of global governance in the current period is fragmentation into a complex and
multi-layered network of bodies and institutions.").
38. See Teresa Ter-Minassian, Decentralizing Government, FIN. & DEv., Sept. 1997, at 36,
36 (noting a worldwide trend in the last few decades of devolving decision-making responsibilities to
subnational levels of government). More malign definitions cast fragmentation in a nationalistic or
disintegrative light. See, e.g., Elie Kedourie, A New International Disorder, in THE EXPANSION OF
INTERNATIONAL SOCmTY 347, 349 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984) (referring to national
self-determination as "a principle of disorder, not of order"). James Mayall, however, points out that
this is simply a matter of perspective:
In the West, nationalism is very often considered to be a curse, whereas in the South it
is thought of as a blessing. The explanation of this difference in perception can only be
historical: in the one case nationalism is associated with war, destruction and irrational
intolerance; in the other with progress, the transcendence of parochial loyalties and
development.
JAMES MAYALL, NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL SOCmTY 111 (1990).
39. See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA 2-3 (1995)
(noting that "[i]n the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught up in a
maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation"). In the most dismissive
analysis, some portray fragmentation as an atavistic remnant of past structures that survives in an era
of globalization. According to this argument, "nations and nationalism are the epigoni of their
illustrious predecessors, survivals from another epoch, which are destined to pass away once they
have run their course in each part of the globe." Id. at 3. Smith himself does not agree with this
portrayal. See id. at 5. Eric Hobsbawm embraces this position in the extreme, by characterizing
nationalism and ethnic groupings not only as a survival of European attempts to order the world but
also-in the scheme of world history-as relatively meaningless. See E.J. HoBSBAWM, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM SINCE 1870, at 181-82 (2d ed. 1992); see also SMITH, supra, at 3 (noting the argument
that fragmentation is a survival from an earlier age). On the other hand, others argue that
fragmentation is a dialectical response to globalization. According to this argument, globalization is
not always perceived as a benign or advantageous force, and in fact "globalization stimulates forces of
opposition which may just as readily lead to an increasingly fragmented world." Anthony G. McGrew
et al., Introduction to GLOBAL POLICS: GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION STATE 1, 23 (Anthony G.
McGrew et al. eds., 1992). Reasons for opposition would include resistance to the perceived Western
cultural hegemony in economic globalization, and the self-interest of political and other factions that
could become losers in an economically globalized world. See ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 18-19
(suggesting that many of the particularist ideologies that shaped the 20th century were engendered by
concern over the Western nature of globalization); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, GEOPOLITICS AND
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The more sophisticated of these competing views is that of
globalization and fragmentation as complementary components of the same
phenomenon. From a sociological perspective, Robertson perceives
fragmentation as "an aspect-or, indeed, as a creation-of globalization"
because "identity declaration is built into the general process of
globalization."40 Legal scholars such as Oscar Schachter and Sol Picciotto
echo Robertson's analysis. 4t
Economic globalization and political fragmentation comport with
underlying economic and democracy theories. Economic globalization offers
a clear and discernible advantage, in the form of specialization and the
consequent allocation of resources to their most efficient uses. On the other
hand, the advantage to political globalization is not so clear.4" Indeed,
Robert Dahl identifies the conundrum that accompanies large democratic
institutions:
In very small political systems a citizen may be able to participate extensively in
decisions that do not matter much but cannot participate much in decisions that really
matter a great deal; whereas very large systems may be able to cope with problems that
matter more to a citizen, the opportunities for the citizen to participate in and greatly
influence decisions are vastly reduced.4 3
GEOCULTURE: ESSAYS ON THE CHANGING WORLD-SYSTEM 154 (1991) (explaining tension between
"nationalism" and "internationalism"); Robert W. Cox, Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualization
of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn RKhaldun, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLmCS 132, 143-45 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-
Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (predicting intense resistance to globalization by those who will be
disadvantaged by it); Susan Olzak, Ethnic Protest in Core and Periphery States, 21 ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 187, 187 (1998) (stating that the increased integration of the world economic system causes
ethnic fragmentation within states); R.B.J. Walker, World Politics and Western Reason: Universalism,
Pluralism, Hegemony, in CULTURE, IDEOLOGY AND WORLD ORDER 182, 183 (R.B.J. Walker ed.,
1984) (stating that resistance to modernization along Western lines "has become a major characteristic
of the twentieth century").
40. ROBERTSON, supra note 19, at 174-75 (acknowledging that the general process includes
room for fragmentation "as reaction or resistance" to globalization).
41. See Picciotto, supra note 37, at 1021 (noting that increasing economic integration
reveals an increasingly fragmented political structure); Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-
State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 17 (1997) ("The
fact that a trend toward localism has occurred when the world has become more interdependent and
integrated ... [is] a natural response to globalization, which leaves people with a sense that remote
anonymous forces control their lives.").
42. Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that decentralization of decision-making
authority is advantageous. See, e.g., James Anderson et al., The Effects of Government
Decentralization During Transition: Evidence From Enterprise-State Relations in Mongolia, 38 POST-
SOVIET GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 230, 244-45 (1997) (finding that devolution has benefits for
government similar to those that privatization creates for enterprises).
43. Robert A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen
Participation, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 23, 28 (1994).
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It is predictable, therefore, that even as economic entrepreneurs create a
global commercial network, citizens will demand that important political
decisions must be dealt with at a more localized level.'
Fragmentation need not occur along national lines; 41 indeed, some of
the more interesting questions regarding fragmentation involve local polities.
The recent devolution of decision-making power from the British
government to newly-created parliaments in Scotland and Wales is but one
example. 6 In the United States, devolution occurs when decision-making
moves from the federal to the state and city level. 47 In some newly-created
countries, decision-making power has devolved to ethnic groups.48 For the
purposes of analyzing the need to criminalize transnational bribery,
however, the locus of fragmentation need not be identified. What is more
critical is the observation that economic globalization is not accompanied by
political globalization.49
It would be easy to mistake the various international organizations that
coordinate economic policy as a global centralization of power, but this is
not the case. International attention to transnational bribery illustrates this
point. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
the Organization of American States have undertaken the most vigorous anti-
bribery efforts to date. 0 The Organization of American States, which is
44. See Ter-Minassian, supra note 38, at 36 (stating that devolution is democratic because it
allows participation).
45. However, in many respects, the carving out of countries such as Eritrea, Kazakhstan,
and Slovenia from larger countries represents a form of devolution along national lines. See generally
Tom NAIRN, FACES oF NATIONALISM: JANUS REVISITED 143-49 (1997) (discussing the creation of
"micro-states").
46. See Laura McAllister, The Welsh Devolution Referendum: Definitely, Maybe?, 51
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 149, 149-65 (1998) (discussing devolution to the Welsh parliament); James
Mitchell et al., The 1997 Devolution Referendum in Scotland, 51 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 166, 166-81
(1998) (discussing devolution to the Scottish parliament).
47. See Peter Eisinger, City Politics in an Era of Federal Devolution, 33 URB. AF. REv.
308, 308 (1998) (noting that the increasing frequency of devolution is changing the tenor of city
politics); Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 65, 65-68 (1996) (discussing devolution of financial regulation to state
governments); Scott Mackey, Devolution: Part II?, STATE LEGISLATURES, April 1998, at 20 (listing
decision-making responsibilities that have devolved to the state level).
48. See Charles King, Minorities Policy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of the
Gagauzi, 20 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 738, 738-56 (1997) (describing Moldava's devolution of power
to ethnic Gagauzi in the Yeri region as a very successful example of devolution of centralized
authority to local units).
49. See, e.g., Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream": Globalization
and Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REo. 205, 206 (1995)
(stating that the increase in economic globalization is not accompanied by a globalization of
environmental protection).
50. In addition to the OECD and the Organization of American States, the United Nations
and the International Chamber of Commerce have condemned transnational bribery and have asked
their constituencies to eschew bribery. See Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in
International Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (1997); Extortion and Bribery in International Business
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comprised of over thirty countries in North and South America,"1
promulgated in 1996 a treaty that requires its members to take certain
actions with respect to transnational bribery.52 Specifically, the treaty
requires signatories to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials.53 The
treaty further requires signatories to allow extradition of bribe-givers and
bribe-taking officials and contains a pledge that signatories will not invoke
bank secrecy laws to impede investigations into corruption.54 The treaty also
requires signatories to make it a crime for a government official to possess
or acquire assets "that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful
earnings during the performance of his functions." 55 Twenty-three members
of the Organization have signed the treaty.56
Transactions, Ad Hoe Committee on Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions,
International Chamber of Commerce, pt. 2, ICC Doc. 193/15 (Mar. 26, 1996). The European Union
has also promulgated a treaty requiring prohibition of bribery of officials of one member state by
persons from another member state. See Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May
26, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1. The author of this Article has suggested that the World Trade
Organization has the authority to consider transnational bribery, but that the World Trade
Organization has not yet explicitly done so. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade
Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 711 (1996).
51. See 0. CARLOS STOETZER, THRE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: AN
INTRODUCTION 1 (2d ed. 1993) (describing membership of the Organization).
52. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.
The Convention imposes 'a number of requirements in addition to the criminalization of transnational
bribery. See Rex J. Zedalis, Internationalizing Prohibitions on Foreign Corrupt Practices: The OAS
Convention and the OECD Revised Recommendation, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 45, 55 (1997).
53. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 52, art. 5; see also
Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: A Comparison with the
United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 243, 247-49 (1998) (discussing the
requirement).
54. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 52, arts. 13, 16
(discussing extradition and bank secrecy). The provision with respect to extradition is particularly
important in Latin America, which has a very strong tradition of providing asylum to government
officials from other countries. See Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Terror at the Emperor's Birthday Party: An
Analysis of the Hostage-Taking Incident at the Japanese Embassy in Lima, Peru, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L.
1, 64 (1997) (noting that the idea of asylum is strongest in Latin America). Indeed, an analysis
concluded a number of years ago found that leaders seeking asylum in Latin American countries were
never extradited. See Otto Kirchheimer, Asylum, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 985, 1001-05 (1959). The
prohibition on the use of bank secrecy laws to thwart investigations is also "potentially very
important." Low et al., supra note 53, at 254.
55. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 52, art. 9. Illicit enrichment
provisions exist in other anti-corruption legislation. See, e.g., Prevention of Corruption Act (1988)
(India) § 13(l)(d). The illicit enrichment provision of the Inter-American Convention, however, is
problematic for the United States because, as written, it appears to violate the presumption of
innocence mandated by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Low et al., supra
note 53, at 281.
56. The Convention has been signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, the United States, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. See Low et al., supra note 53, at 245 n.2.
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also
promulgated, at the close of 1997, a treaty requiring its members to take
certain actions with respect to transnational bribery.57 Again, the treaty
requires signatories to crinminalize the bribery of foreign government
officials,5" and penalties for such bribes must be proportionate to the
penalties for domestic bribery.59 Signatories are required to assist one
another in the investigation of bribery, and to allow extradition of bribe-
givers.' Each of the twenty-nine members of the Organization, as well as
five nonmembers, signed the treaty.61
The treaties promulgated by the Organization of American States and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development do not
constitute the criminalization of a behavior by a supranational body.62
Rather, the treaties coordinate acts of criminalization by various countries.
Paul Taylor's excellent taxonomy of international organizations, which
marks a sophisticated departure from the practice of dividing such
organizations on the basis of governmental participation,63 classifies
international organizations according to the theory underlying each. Taylor
proposes three main groupings: "adjustment theories," which explain the
responses of national governments to changes in the global environment;
"integration theories," which anticipate a refashioning of the traditional
state-centered system of international relations; and "constitutional
57. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. I [hereinafter OECD Convention].
58. See id. art. 1.1. Stanley Arkin criticizes the OECD Convention for its failure to include
political parties among those who may not be bribed, for its failure to require the amendment of tax
laws so as to remove the deductibility of bribes, and for its failure to impose accounting provisions
that would mitigate the ability of companies to hide bribe payments. See Stanley S. Arkin, Bribery of
Foreign Officials: Leveling the Playing Field, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 19, 1998, at 3, 3.
59. See OECD Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.2.
60. See id. arts. 9, 10 (discussing assistance and extradition); see also Dominic Bencivenga,
Anti-Bribery Pact: 34 Nations Agree to Prosecute Business Payoffs, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 15, 1998, at 5, 5
(characterizing these provisions as "critical").
61. The 29 members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The five signing nonmembers are
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and Slovakia. See Ayesha Qayyam, New Anti-Bribery Treaty
Analyzed, INT'L COM. Lmno., Mar. 1998, at 27, 27. A number of signatories have already submitted
enabling legislation to their legislatures. See, e.g., Bribery Rife in Foreign Trade, CANBERRA Timss,
Apr. 13, 1998, at 9 (discussing legislation in Australia); Colin Brown, Bribery Overseas Will be
Offence in Britain, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 19, 1998, at 13 (discussing legislation in Britain);
New, Higher Fine to Cover Overseas Bribery, NIKKEI WKLY., Apr. 13, 1998, at 4 (discussing
legislation in Japan); Jennifer Sullivan, Firms Liable for Overseas Deals, OTrAWA SUN, June 25,
1998, at 26 (discussing legislation in Canada).
62. Indeed, if such were possible, the treaties would be unnecessary.
63. The classic division of international organizations includes "intergovernmental
organizations," "transgovernmental organizations," "international nongovernmental organizations,"
and "business international nongovernmental organizations." See CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 36-42 (1992).
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theories," which completely abandon the state-oriented system and look to
new methods of ordering the world.' The corruption treaties clearly fall
within the first grouping. These treaties represent a reaction by countries
rather than an integration of countries, and they certainly do not represent a
non-state-centered system of ordering international relations. Indeed, each of
the treaties specifies that it is to be implemented by each signatory in
accordance with that signatory's legal systems and principles.6"
C. The Anomaly of Globalization and Fragmentation
Institutional analysis is useful when examining, from a legal
perspective, the confluence of globalization and fragmentation.66 Institutions
are "principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which
actor expectations converge in a given area."67 Institutions range from
cognitive patterns such as alphabets68 to adjudicatory bodies, property
64. See Paul Taylor, A Conceptual Typology of International Organization, in FRAMEWORKS
FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 12, 12 (A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor eds., 1990). Within each
main grouping Taylor describes a number of subgroups. See id.
65. See OECD Convention, supra note 57, arts. 4.2, 4.4.; Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, supra note 52, art. 8; see also Low et al., supra note 53, at 248 (expressing
concern regarding this "potentially significant condition"). Neither convention prohibits signatories
from taking exception to provisions, which would allow signatories not to apply or adhere to these
provisions.
66. Institutionalism has become a useful and used tool for legal analysis. See William J.
Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
227, 229 (1997) (noting the increasing use of institutionalism in international legal scholarship);
Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1393 (1996) (predicting that institutionalism will create a
unified theory for legal scholarship). Institutionalism is also prevalent in other disciplines. See Peter
A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 49 POL.
STUD. 936 (1996) (explicating and comparing historical institutionalism, institutional economics, and
sociological institutionalism); Vivien Lowndes, Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 181-82 (1996) (noting the revival in and variety of institutionalisms
in the social sciences).
67. Stephen Krasner, Structural Cause and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); see also PETER A. HALL,
GOVERNING THE ECONOMY: THE POLITICS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 19
(1986) (defining institutions as "the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating
practices that structure the relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and
economy"); Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter, Structural Change, Power Politics, and Community
Organizations in Africa: Challenging the Patterns, Puzzles and Paradoxes, 22 WORLD DEv. 1479,
1480 (1994) (defining institutions as "previously established sets of guidelines within which a given
group of people relate to one another"). Note that though Krasner was defining the term "regime,"
see Krasner, supra, at 1, later international relations scholarship found this term to be equivalent to
"institution." See John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 140 (1996).
68. See W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organization: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, in
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 55, 56 (W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer
eds., 1994) (including as institutions symbols, cognitions, and norms that organize the human
condition and are considered mandatory). Of course, the various disciplines each suggest different
definitions of "institution." See Hall & Taylor, supra note 66, passim (comparing differing definitions
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systems, and the law. 9 Institutions facilitate many things, including
commercial relations.70
One expression of globalization is the creation of commercial
relationships without regard for national boundaries. 71 The communities
formed by these relationships are as legitimate as any other community, and
by facilitating specialization, such relationships benefit the world in
general. 72 As is true of any community, transnational economic relationships
rely on institutions, including and particularly the law.73
Even as economic relations extend further outward, however, the
bodies that create law break down into more localized entities. Transnational
communities do not enjoy counterparts to domestic institutions. There is no
single transnational body that can, by its own acts, criminalize any type of
commercial behavior. There is no body that can act as a cross-border
international police. Nor is there a global body to try those whose economic
crimes cross borders.
The need for prohibition of transnational bribery must be evaluated in
the context of this anomaly and with a sensitivity to increased transnational
activity. In simple terms, it can be argued that globalization has caused the
amount of transnational bribery to increase and that fragmentation has
limited the viability of host country regulation. In order to explore this
argument, it is first necessary to examine the nature, increase in, and
attendant harms of transnational bribery.
III. TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
Increased economic integration has brought with it an increase in
transnational bribery.74 As noted in the Introduction, bribery is a transaction
of institutions among different disciplines).
69. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 222 (1993) (noting that the concept of institutions is
broader than but includes international law); Thomas-Slayter, supra note 67, at 1480 (stating that legal
codes and property systems are institutions).
70. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 1 (1975) (noting that markets require institutions); Niel Fligstein, Markets as Politics: A
Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions, 61 AM. Soc. Rv. 656 (1996) (noting that markets
are inseparable from institutions). Williamson is an economic institutionalist and Fligstein is a
sociological institutionalist; their observations illustrate that virtually all of the schools of
institutionalism agree that commercial transactions require institutions.
71. See Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 50, 50 (noting
that globalization has led to the creation of relationships with little regard for national boundaries).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29 (discussing the benefits of specialization).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. See Patrick Glynn et al., The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 10, at 7, 12-15 (discussing how globalization has globalized
corruption); Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against International
Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 549, 550 (1997) (noting that globalization has globalized corruption).
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in which a bribe-giver gives something of value in exchange for a benefit
conferred through abuse or misuse of the bribe-taker's office.75  In
transnational bribery, the transaction stretches across borders.
Philip Oldenburg divides the benefits conferred on bribe-givers into
two categories: according-to-rule benefits and against-the-rules benefits. 6
According-to-rule benefits are benefits that the bribe-giver should have
received pursuant to the rules; the bribe-taker takes action that he or she
should have taken anyway. The abuse of office therefore occurs when the
bribe-taker acts on the bribe-giver's request before the requests of others, or
when the bribe-taker refuses to use his or her office in the absence of
extralegal payments. Common examples include matters such as routine
government approvals or the provision of basic government services."
Bribes paid in order to obtain these benefits are often referred to as
"facilitating payments." 78
75. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5; see also James Lindgren, The Elusive
Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L.
REv. 815, 823 (1988) ("[W]hen a briber corruptly pays off a public official, he is paying to get some
results for himself or those he favors. He is seeking preferential treatment."); Frank J. Sorauf,
Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1348, 1350 (1994) (stating that "quid pro quo" is "the vital element of any definition of
bribery"). Bribery is only one of many forms of corruption; it is, however, the most prevalent and
prominent form of government corruption. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (1978) ("I shall always keep bribery in the analytical foreground."); Bruce E.
Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 111, 113
("Bribery defined in the traditional sense, the performance of public duty in exchange for something
of personal value, is the paradigmatic instance of political corruption."); Graham Wood, Ethics at the
Purchasing/Sales Interface: An International Perspective, INT'L MARKETING R v., no. 4, 1995, at 7,
16 ("Bribery is seen as being the most significant problem, particularly, though not exclusively, in
trade between North and South."). For a discussion of the varieties of corruption, see RosE-
ACKERMAN, supra, at 4. Note must be made regarding the distinction between bribery and extortion.
Under domestic law, bribery occurs when the bribe-giver initiates the transaction, whereas extortion
occurs when the bribe-taker demands the transaction. See Lindgren, supra, at 823-26. Multilateral
efforts to regulate transnational bribery, however, do not draw this distinction, and this Article will
treat both as transnational bribery. Bribery also may occur between private parties. See Ronald H.
Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269, 270-74 (1979)
(discussing bribery in the private sector). The type of bribery that this Article discusses is limited to
bribery of government officials. Multilateral efforts to date have dealt only with bribery of public
officials.
76. See Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implication of an Indian
Case, 39 WORLD POL. 508, 523 (1987). Oldenburg does not use the phrase "against-the-rules
benefits;" he refers instead to "illegal and improper work." Id.
77. See, e.g., Husted, supra note 1, at 20-21 (describing bribe payments made to expedite
issuance of driver's licenses in Mexico); Salim Rashid, Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC's: The
Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency, 34 KYKLOS: INT'L REv. FOR SOC. Sc. 448, 448-55
(1981) (describing bribe payments made to obtain telephone lines and to place overseas and domestic
calls in India).
78. See Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business
in Latin America: Adapting to a Changing Legal Environment, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 53 (1994)
(comments of Clyde McFarland).
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According-to-rule benefits can also include the award of a large
contract that the bribe-giver should have won in the absence of a bribe.
More likely, however, a bribe will result in the award of a contract to a
party who should not have won-an against-the-rules benefit.79 In either
case, the abuse of office, usually for large sums of money, involves the
discretion of the public official. This type of bribery is often referred to as
grand corruption when large sums of money are involved."0
A. The Amount of Transnational Bribery Has Increased
Quantitative treatment of bribery is virtually impossible: bribery is
illegal in every country in the world and is thus chronically difficult to
observe.8' Therefore, anecdotal, nonquantitative data must be used.8"
Nonetheless, several observations can be made, including the observation
that the incidence of transnational bribery has increased greatly over the last
few decades.
Globalization has exposed a number of persons to transnational
commerce for the first time. Those whose only exposure has occurred under
present conditions might believe that the current pervasiveness of grand
corruption has existed for a long period of time. In fact, bribery as a
phenomenon is as old as bureaucratic systems. 3 Those who have worked in
international commerce for long periods of time, however, observe that the
prevalence of large-scale transnational bribery is a recent occurrence:
79. As discussed infra, corrupt systems reward those who divert resources from the quality
of the good or service to the payment of the bribe. See infra text accompanying note 107.
80. See GEORGE MOODY-STUART, THE GOOD BUSINEss GUIDE TO BRIBERY: GRAND
CORRUPTION IN THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1 (1994) (describing grand corruption).
81. See HEIMANN, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that every country in the world criminalizes
bribery of its own officials). By their very nature, bribes must be paid in secret, and officials are
generally reluctant to discuss bribes. See id. at 7 (noting that "bribes have to be paid in secret
everywhere" and that "officials receiving bribes have to resign in disgrace if the bribe is disclosed").
One scholar argues that there are methods to collect corruption data:
While the difficulties of obtaining systematic data on corruption cannot be slighted,
with some perseverance the conventional tools of research may still be employed to
advantage. For example, if one wishes to investigate corruption in the customs
department, the interviews may be directed to importers or retired officials of the
department; officials in active service, unless honest, are less likely to volunteer
information. That such studies have been rare attests less to their difficulties than to the
lack of demand for them in the ruling circles of developing societies.
M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of
Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 441, 443 (1989). The author of this Article, who has
recently completed fieldwork on corruption in a transition economy, can attest that Alam's calm tone
does not adequately reflect the stark terror that often accompanies such an investigation.
82. C. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 823 (1993) (noting the superiority of impressionistic over
statistical data in some circumstances).
83. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIEs 4-5 (1984) (discussing the ancient practice of
bribery).
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mhe incidence of grand corruption has increased tremendously during the last decade.
What used to concern a relatively small number of people working in a relatively small
number of countries has now become a major South-wide problem.. . . By general
consensus, there has been a tremendous deterioration in the last ten years, with grand
corruption becoming the general rule, rather than the exception, in major government-
influenced contracts in the South.Y
The perception that corruption is increasing is not limited to
businesspersons working with transition economies. In a survey of 150 elite
persons from sixty-three developing countries, almost half believed that
corruption had increased in their countries over the past ten years. 5
Many factors contribute to corruption in general. The World Bank
suggests that opaque regulatory systems combined with weak enforcement
institutions create an environment in which persons are more likely to offer
bribes and public officials are more likely to yield to the temptations offered
them.86 Patrick Glynn, Stephen Kobrin, and Moisds Nafm suggest that
"systemic political change has weakened or destroyed social, political, and
legal institutions, opening the way to new abuses."87 Others emphasize the
role that law plays in checking corruption.88
These factors undoubtedly contribute to transnational bribery. With
respect to transnational bribery, however, the offer and supply of bribes by
investors from industrialized countries also constitutes a significant
contributory factor.89 Ibrahim Shihata notes that "[f]oreign business,
84. MOODY-STuART, supra note 80, at 2-3; see also Konyin Ajay, On the Trail of a
Spectre-Destabilisation of Developing and Transitional Countries: A Case Study of Corruption in
Nigeria, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 545, 545 (1997) (noting "[tihe astronomical dimension which
corruption has recently taken in most parts of the world").
85. See Daniel Kaufinann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997, at 114,
125.
86. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THm STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD 103-04 (1997).
87. Glynn et al., supra note 74, at 8. These scholars, who are each members of the World
Economic Forum's Davos Group, acknowledge that there is now a greater awareness and exposure of
corruption, but also state that actual levels of corruption have increased. See id.
88. See Congressman John Porter, Address at the Washington College of Law Conference
on Hong Kong: Preserving Human Rights and the Rule of Law (March 18-19, 1997), 12 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 400 (1998) ("Without the rule of law, bribery and corruption will flourish,
and those without the necessary connections will be left out in the cold.").
89. See MOODY-STUART, supra note 80, at 27 ("[lIlnitially, at least, a far higher share of
responsibility must rest on the tempters than on the tempted."); Beverly Earle, The United States'
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion
Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 221-23 (1996) (arguing that
Americans make a significant contribution to international bribery); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy
W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Within the American Response to Domestic Concerns,
15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 509, 526 (1997) (stating that Western companies export the practice of bribery).
Of course, these observations are difficult to quantify or even to discuss on anything other than a
general level. For an interesting case study of corruption that specifically explicates the influence of
bribe-offering foreign investors and discusses how foreign investors spread the practice of bribery
throughout Russia, see Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121, 131-33 (1996). Interestingly, an article from an
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especially in developing countries, often contributes to the spread of
corruption by assuming that pay-offs and connections are inevitable facts of
doing business-an attitude which often turns out to a self-fulfilling
prophecy."' The Speaker of the South African Parliament, noting "'that
international corruption is often tacitly supported and actively encouraged by
Western countries,"' concluded "'that attributing corruption to our [African]
cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well as convenient and self-
serving."91
In short, while quantifiable data is impossible to obtain, reliable
observations indicate that transnational bribery is widespread and that the
incidence of transnational bribery is probably increasing. There are several
possible reasons for the recent explosion in transnational bribery. Clearly,
the offer of bribes and export of corruption by investors from Western
countries is among those reasons.
B. Transnational Bribery is Harmful
The overwhelming consensus in both the economics and political
science literature is that bribery is harmful.Y In order to justify home
Indonesian newspaper, which Professor Salbu offers as support for an Indonesian culture of gift-
giving, see Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the
Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223 at 235 n.70 (1999), lays the blame for that
country's corruption squarely on the shoulders of foreign investors. See Donna K. Woodward,
Foreigners Fathered RI's Graft, JAKARTA PosT, Dec. 17, 1997, at 4 (reporting that foreigners in
Indonesia contributed to bribery within the country).
90. Ibrahim Shihata, Corruption-A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the
World Bank, 15 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 451, 461 (1997).
91. Anvers Versi, On Corruption and Corrupters, AFR. Bus., Nov. 1996, at 7 (quoting Dr.
Frene Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African Parliament). Indeed, the significance of bribe suppliers
to the spread of transnational bribery is of such concern that the most prominent nongovernmental
organization dealing with bribery plans to publish an index ranking countries in terms of the frequency
with which their citizens supply or offer bribes. See Transparency International, Frequently Asked
Questions (visited Oct. 8, 1998) <http:I/www.gwdg.del-uwvw/faqs97.htm>. Transparency
International and its current survey are discussed infra text accompanying notes 123-127.
92. Occasionally, of course, echoes of Nathaniel Left's famous "speed money" argument
bubble up into the current literature. See Nathaniel Leff, Economic Development Through
Bureaucratic Corruption, AM. BEHAv. ScmiwrsT, Nov. 1964, at 10-11 (arguing that bribes act as
"speed moneys" that allow investors to avoid bureaucratic delays, and that bribes induce government
workers to work harder). The weakness of these and similar arguments, see, e.g., Bayley, supra note
1, at 719 (arguing that corruption in developing nations is not necessarily antipathetic to the
development of modern economic systems), is that they take a very static or isolated (or both) view of
corruption and fail to take into account its cumulative effects. As the World Bank points out,
[a] small side payment for a government service may seem a minor offense, but it is not
the only cost-corruption can have far reaching externalities. Unchecked, the creeping
accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy to
the point where even noncorrupt officials and members of the public see little point in
playing by the rules.
WORLD BANK, supra note 86, at 102. Indeed, in a study of bribes paid to obtain telephone service in
India, Salim Rashid concluded that while at first the bribes may have served to differentiate
preferences among customers in an officially egalitarian system, in a relatively short period of time
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country criminalization of transnational bribery as a policy choice, however,
the harms must be briefly reviewed. Transnational bribery causes economic,
systemic, and social damage.
1. Transnational Bribery Causes Economic Damage
In the most basic sense, corruption causes economies to operate in
ways other than the way economies are supposed to work. "A fundamental
tenet of a free market system is that economic transactions should be based
solely on the price and quality of a product and the service provided by the
seller." '93 In a corrupted transaction, the decision is based not on price and
quality, but instead on which supplier is able to pay the largest bribe.94
Bribery also has specific effects on an economy. A growing body of
empirical work demonstrates a negative correlation between perceived levels
of corruption and foreign direct investment. Paolo Mauro's statistical study
of the relationship between corruption and private investment finds that
corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth.95
"The negative association between corruption and investment, as well as
growth, is significant, both in a statistical and in an economic sense."96 In a
later study, Mauro finds that a measurable decrease in the level of
corruption in a country would raise its investment to gross domestic product
ratio by almost four percent and the annual growth of its gross domestic
product per capita by almost half a percent.97
Bribery has other specific economic effects. Large-scale bribery
distorts relative prices by causing an excessive amount of money to flow into
the government without engendering any corresponding output by the
government.9" Bribery also lowers the tax base by allowing potential
taxpayers to bribe away tax requirements.99
the system degraded to the point where officials simply demanded bribes from all customers and even
impeded service in order to extract larger bribes. See Rashid, supra note 77, at 456-57.
93. Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983); see also Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act To Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 213 (1994) (stating that
"bribery sabotages the free market system").
94. See Alam, supra note 81, at 450 (noting not only that the quality of the good is
disregarded, but also' that suppliers who cheat on the quality of the good in order to pay larger bribes
will be "successful" in such a transaction).
95. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 700-04 (1995).
96. Id. at 705.
97. See Paolo Mauro, The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government
Expenditure: A Cross Country Analysis, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 10,
at 83, 91. Considering the fact that the average annual growth rate in world domestic product is
between 2.5 and 3.0 percent, half a percentage point represents a considerable improvement.
98. See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of Corrupt Government, With
Special Application to Less Developed Countries, 28 KYKLOS: INT'L Rev. FOR SOC. SCl. 47, 55
(1975). Taxes also divert large amounts of money to the government, but "the imperative of secrecy
makes bribes more distortionary than taxes." Andrei Schliefer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108
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The economic damage caused by transnational bribery has in turn
damaged millions of lives. Mauro's work demonstrates that corruption, of
which bribery is a major part, decreases growth in gross domestic
product."0 Low growth rates are directly correlated with deteriorations in
living conditions; ' in particular, low growth rates affect health, mortality
rates, and environmental quality."ta
Indeed, while economic studies demonstrate that bribery damages
economies, the experiences of millions of people demonstrate that, left
unchecked, bribery can savage an economy. The once vibrant middle class
of Nigeria has watched its wealth disappear, its neighborhoods turn into
slums, and its children grow up in hardship due to the corruption of the
economy. 103 In Kenya, the already poor are violently forced from their land
by persons who acquire title through bribes.l"4 All Zaireans suffered as their
country sank into "a Zaire-shaped hole in the middle of Africa. It has been
sold, bought, appropriated, stolen." ' °
2. Bribery Causes Systemic Damage
Bribery damages systems on two levels: the level of discrete
transactions and the level of administrative systems. At the level of discrete
transactions, bribery creates an incentive not to fulfill the terms of a
contract. In a corrupt transaction, a contract is not awarded on the basis of
quality or price but instead on the basis of the bribe paid. ' 6 Thus, there is no
incentive to provide goods or services as specified in the contract. There is,
however, a strong incentive to divert resources from fulfilling the contract in
Q.J. ECON. 599, 600 (1993).
99. See Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Government Activities, and Markets, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1,
1995, at 24, 26.
100. See supra text accompanying note 95.
101. See Morris D. Morris, Book Review, 39 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 667, 668-
69 (1991) ("Although cautions occasionally are noted, there is a general acceptance of the correlation
between declining economic growth rates and deteriorating social conditions.").
102. See Tord Kjellstrom et al., Current and Future Determinants of Adult Ill-Health, in THE
HEALTH OF ADULTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 209, 211-13 (Richard G.A. Feacham et al. eds.,
1992) (discussing the relationship between poverty and ill health and concluding that improved health
requires decreases in poverty); Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the
Developing Counties, 23 ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993) ("[l1f poor societies fail to improve the living
standards of their people, persistent poverty may turn out to be the most aggravating and destructive
of all environmental problems."); Christopher J.L. Murray et al., Adult Mortality: Levels, Patterns
and Causes, in THE HEALTH OF ADULTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra, at 23, 50 (finding a
"statistically significant" positive correlation between higher incomes and lower mortality in adults
and children).
103. See Dele Olojede, Nouveau Poor: Middle Class is Gone in Nigeria, NEWSDAY (New
York), June 9, 1995, at A22.
104. See Liz Sly, Caught in Corruption's Stranglehold, Cut. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1995, at Al.
105. A Hole in the Map of Africa, EcONOMIST, July 8, 1996, at A9.
106. See Bader & Shaw, supra note 93, at 627 (noting that distortion of "the relationship
between price and quality" results from bribery).
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order to pay larger bribes.1"7 On its face the object of a transaction may
appear to be the transfer of a good or a service,"'8 but bribery corrupts the
transaction so that in practice the object is the transfer of an illicit payment.
Bribery also degrades administrative systems. Pervasive corruption
tends to drive out honest and effective bureaucrats, leaving only the
dishonest and ineffective. 0 9 Resources are diverted from productive
purposes to efforts to hide bribery.1 Bureaucrats may hold back resources
or information in an effort to extract larger payments from bribe-givers."1
Indeed, one of the observable effects of a bribe-taking administrative system
is that persons who deal with such a bureaucracy tend to discount all
information given by it as false or misleading.'
3. Bribery Causes Social Damage
Not only does bribery distort economies and debilitate administrative
systems, it also corrodes societal structures. The myth that bribery is
acceptable in some cultures finds no empirical support.1 To the contrary,
107. See Alam, supra note 81, at 450; Kaufmann, supra note 85, at 118 (noting the incentive
to cheat).
108. See OLIVER E6. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1 (1985)
(defining a transaction as the transfer of a good or a service "across a technologically separable
interface").
109. See Johnson, supra note 98, at 57 (noting that efficient potential government employees
will avoid government work for moral reasons when corruption is pervasive); Tanzi, supra note 99, at
26 ("Some individuals will try to get jobs not in the areas in which they might use their particular
ability for productive use but in areas that provide scope for taking advantage of their special
positions."). The author of this Article has spoken with numerous young persons in Central and
Southeast Asia who expressed fear that working in government would corrupt them morally.
110. See M.S. Alam, A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Applications, 48 KYKLos:
INT'L REV. FOR Soc. ScI. 419, 431 (1995) (stating that "there will be waste of resources used in the
cover-up of illicit activities").
111. See Alam, supra note 81, at 449 (explaining how "bribery may impose costs because of
the official's efforts to maximize the offers of bribes" by creating false uncertainties).
112. One of the most comprehensive observational studies of bribery is that of the Irrigation
Department in a southern Indian state conducted by Robert Wade. After several periods of observation
between 1976 and 1981, Wade concluded that virtually the entire system was corrupt. See Robert
Wade, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India, 18 J.
Dav. STUD. 287, 287, 291 (1982). Among other things, officials extracted bribes, called ayacut, from
farmers for extra water or for the water already allocated to those farmers. See id. at 314. Wade
found that officials actively created uncertainties among farmers in order to generate greater ayacut.
Wade also found that the credibility of the Irrigation Department had deteriorated to the point that
farmers did not believe warnings about impending water shortages. See id. at 314-15; see also Robert
Wade, Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Popular Anarchy: An Indian Case, 14 J. DEv. EcON. 285
(1984) (discussing Wade's observational study further).
113. Judge Noonan, in his authoritative treatment of the subject, dismisses the myth as an
example of cultural arrogance: "[1It is often the Westerner with ethnocentric prejudice who supposes
that a modern Asian or African society does not regard the act of bribery as shameful in the way
Westerners regard it." NOONAN, supra note 83, at 703; see also Versi, supra note 91, at 7
("'[A]ttributing corruption to [African] cultures is both arrogant and racist, as well as convenient and
self-serving. It says more about the culture of the North, than our own.'" (quoting Dr. Frene
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the empirical work uniformly demonstrates that even persons who live in
polities plagued by endemic bribery regard bribery as objectionable.
114
Every major religion or school of moral thought, including Buddhism,
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and
Taoism, specifically condemns bribery." 5 "That bribes have to be paid
secretly everywhere, and that officials receiving bribes have to resign in
disgrace if the bribe is disclosed, makes clear that bribery violates the moral
standards of the South and the East, just as it does in the West."" 6 Granted,
the precise boundaries of what constitutes a bribe may differ; nonetheless,
the concept of bribery is universally condemned." 7
Ginwalla, Speaker of the South African Parliament)). Ginwalla nicely answers Robert Solomon's
question, upon which Salbu bases his own assertion of global pluralism with respect to bribery:
"Bribery is illegal and unethical here because it contradicts our notion of a free and open market. But
does the same apply in the third world, where business (and social life) have very different
presuppositions?" ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS: ETHICS AND FREE
ENTERPRISE IN THE GLOBAL 1990s, at 65 (1994); see Salbu, supra note 89, at 233 n. 55 (citing
Solomon).
114. The best example is a study conducted in Sierra Leone under the supervision of Sahr
John Kpundeh. Even though bribery is commonplace in Sierra Leone, 89 percent of those surveyed
stated that bribery was doing a great deal of harm to Sierra Leone, and 97 percent suggested that
reducing bribery should be a priority for the government. See SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POLITICS AND
CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SmRRA LEONE 109, 115 (1995); see also Kaufmann,
supra note 85, at 125 (noting that in a survey of 150 persons from developing and transition countries,
corruption was both condemned and rated as the most severe obstacle to development). A story related
to the author of this Article by a Greek colleague might shed some light on the genesis of the myth
that corruption is culturally acceptable in some societies. The Greek scholar noted that many years ago
a visit to a doctor was usually followed up with a gift of some tangible item, such as a chicken or a
basket of vegetables. This voluntary gift was meant as a sincere token of respect and gratitude. Over
several years, however, doctors came to expect side payments, and demanded ever larger payments,
often in the intermediary form of money. Now side payments are an institutionalized requirement for
much medical care. According to the scholar who related the story, most Greeks find the required side
payments objectionable and obstructive. Nonetheless, these payments originated as a voluntary and
culturally acceptable expression of gratitude and respect. Joongi Kim and Jong Bum Kim recount a
similar story with respect to ttokkap-rice cake expenses-that were once offered in Korea for the
sake of hospitality or as tokens of gratitude, but which have now degenerated into improper payments.
See Kim & Kim, supra note 74, at 561.
115. See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade
Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 321-22 (1997) (citing primary sources specifically
condemning bribery from each major religion and school of moral thought).
116. HEIMANN, supra note 5, at 7. Heimann concludes the obvious: "There is no country in
the world where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable." Id.; see also RICHARD T. DE
GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 104 (1993) ("In no country do
high government officials openly practice and publicly justify the acceptance of large sums of money
for preferential treatment.").
117. See Shihata, supra note 90, at 453 ("Societies may differ in their views as to what
constitutes corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations."). The core concept of
bribery is a payment as quid pro quo for abuse of office. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
This core concept facilitates multilateral efforts. Indeed, even the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
which is characterized by some as a "sledgehammer," see Salbu, supra note 9, at 266; Salbu, supra
note 89, at 236, uses this concept to avoid criminalizing gifts. See DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 6-19 (1995) (noting that a gift "generally lacks the
element of a quid pro quo" and therefore does not constitute a bribe). Freshly drafted legislation could
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The dissonance and corrosion caused by transnational bribery are
obvious. Bribery is illegal and socially condemned, and yet is practiced by
those in positions of authority. The ability of law enforcers to dispense with
the law and of bribe-givers to buy their way around the law renders the
system meaningless."' Corruption also results in inequitable distributions of
wealth, further adding to social tensions. 9 Ultimately, bribery "undermines
the legitimacy of governments, especially democracies . . . . Citizens may
come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder.
Corruption undermines claims that government is substituting democratic
values for decisions based on ability to pay. It can lead to coups by
undemocratic leaders."1 20
IV. HOST COUNTRY REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY CODES CANNOT
COMPLETELY REACH TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
Those who argue against home country criminalization of transnational
bribery often suggest that the regulation of bribery should be left in the
hands of the host country.' 1 Host country regulation of transnational
bribery, however, is not sufficient.'" At least two factors limit the
effectiveness of host country regulation: host countries are often
experiencing periods of great transition, and bribery tends to corrupt the
very administrative systems that are asked to regulate bribery.
A. Host Countries Are Experiencing Transition
The best available data on relative levels of bribery in various countries
is provided by a European nonprofit organization, Transparency
International.' Transparency International correlates data from various
surveys of perceived levels of corruption into an index."2 The countries'"
make this point clear by criminalizing only those payments that are illegal in the host country.
118. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion
of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. RV. 565,
573 (1992) ("Why should some individuals observe the law when others can pay to elude it? If the
rule of law isn't the rule of law, can anarchy be far behind?"); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences
of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience, 88 POL. Sci. Q. 71, 79 (1973) ("The effect of corruption is
to generate an atmosphere of distrust which pervades all levels of administration.").
119. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 10, at 31, 44.
120. Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
121. See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 9, at 286; Salbu, supra note 89, at 236.
122. The Senior Vice President and General Counsel for the World Bank argues that the
control of a phenomenon such as transnational bribery will require international collaboration. See
Shihata, supra note 90, at 469. Similarly, the Southern African Development Community has asked
"the industrialised countries to criminalise the bribery of our citizens." Versi, supra note 91, at 7.
123. See Michael J. Hershman, Bribery Under Pressure, J. CoM. Apr. 15, 1998, at 7A
(describing and lauding the Transparency International index).
124. The sources used for the 1997 index were two surveys conducted by the Institute for
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evaluated in Transparency International's index are given a score: a score of
ten indicates that businesspersons perceive transactions in the country to be
"perfectly clean," whereas a score of zero indicates that businesspersons
perceive transactions to be "entirely penetrated by corruption."'26
In Transparency International's 1997 index, twenty out of fifty-two
countries are given a score of less than five, indicating that businesspersons
perceive transactions in those countries as more likely corrupt than not
corrupt. 27 The twenty countries-Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China,
Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Romania, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Viet Nam-are spread over five continents and represent a
number of cultures, histories, and political structures. One characteristic is
shared, however, by each of these countries: Each is undergoing a period of
extensive change and transition.'28
Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland; a survey conducted by Political & Economic
Risk Consultancy, Ltd., in Hong Kong; Gallup International's Fiftieth Anniversary Survey; a risk
assessment by DRI/McGraw Hill's Global Risk Service; an assessment by Political Risk Services in
Syracuse, New York; and a survey conducted by G6ttingen University. See Transparency
International, supra note 91. Paolo Mauro suggests that the survey of surveys is accurate:
[The correlation between indices produced by different rating agencies is very high,
suggesting a certain consensus in the ranking of countries according to their degree of
corruption. In addition, the high prices that the rating agencies charge their customers
(usually multinational companies and international banks) for access to these indices are
indirect evidence that the information is useful.
Mauro, supra note 97, at 83.
125. The index only ranks those countries that are included in at least four of the surveys
used as sources. In 1997, 52 countries satisfied this criterion. See Transparency International, supra
note 91, at 1.
126. Transparency International, Index 1997 (visited Oct. 8, 1998)
<http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/rank-97.htm>. Transparency International emphasizes that the
rankings evaluate perceptions.
127. See id.
128. See generally JOSEPH C.H. CHAT, CHINA: TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY (1997)
(describing numerous changes in China); Moists NAiM, PAPER TIGERS AND MINOTAURS: THE
POLITICS OF VENEZUELA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS (1993); SEVANTI NiNAN, THRouGH THE MAGIC
WINDow: TELEVISION AND CHANGE IN INDIA (1995) (discussing cultural and economic changes in
contemporary India); ANDREI SCHLEIFER & DANIEL TREISMAN, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
TRANSITION TO AN OPEN MARKET ECONOMY: RussIA (1998); M. Delal Baer, Misreading Mexico,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1997, at 138 (describing political change in Mexico); Alexandra Barahona de
Brito, Truth and Justice in the Consolidation of Democracy in Chile and Uruguay, 46
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 579 (1993) (discussing democracy building in Uruguay); Jacques Bertrand,
False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia, 69 PAC.
AnF. 319, 321-27 (1996) (discussing three periods of liberalization in Indonesia); Kuk Cho, Tension
Between the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security for What?, 15
B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 (1997) (discussing obstacles to "complete" transition from an authoritarian to a
democratic regime); Frank J. Garcia, "America's Agreements"-An Interim Stage in Building the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 74-76 (1997) (discussing changes
wrought by MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market); Steven E. Hendrix, Advancing Towards
Privatization, Education Reform, Popular Participation, and Decentralization: Bolivia's Innovation in
Legal and Economic Reform, 1993-1997, 14 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 679 (1997) (discussing
changes to many Bolivian institutions); Wendy Hunter, Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations
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One tool for characterizing the change common to these countries is
institutional analysis. The changes occurring in all but one of the
aforementioned countries'29 include a shift in the commercial institutions
from a relational orientation-whether military, mercantilist, socialist, or
traditional-to the formal orientation characterized by the Western notion of
"rule of law."
130
Institutional change of this magnitude is an enormous undertaking for
any society,' and leaves these countries in a vulnerable position.' At a
minimum, the newly formed institutions have little experience in enforcing
the rules, and persons in such countries have little experience using the
newly formed institutions.' 3 More troubling, new institutions can fall prey
in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru, 112 POL. Sci. Q. 453, 463-67 (1997) (discussing how
increase in democratic representation and decrease in military control have changed institutions in
Argentina); Ali Kazancigil, Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective, 43
INT'L SOC. SC. J. 343, 351-54 (1991) (discussing democratic transition in Turkey); Aryeh Neier,
Promoting the Rule of Law in the Former Soviet Bloc, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 81, 85-86
(1996) (discussing judicial reform in Romania); David G. Scalise & Patricia J. de Guzman, Foreign
Investment in the Philippines, 29 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 145 (1995) (discussing the history
of change in Filipino commercial transactions with foreign parties); Kusuma Snitwongse, Thailand in
1994: The Trials of Transition, 35 ASIAN SURV. 194 (1995) (discussing obstacles in Thailand's
transition to democracy); Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Development in South Africa and Venture
Capital: The Challenges and Opportunities for the Enterprise Fund for Southern Africa, 15 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 62 (1997) (discussing economic openness in South Africa); Pamela L. Polevoy, Note,
Privatization in Vietnam: The Next Step in Vietnam's Economic Transition from a Nonmarket to a
Market Economy, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 887 (1998) (discussing the transfer of assets from state to
private sector in Vietnam); Mikaal Shoaib, Comment, The Sweet Sound of the Bazaar: Pakistan's
Efforts to Lure Foreign Investors, 16 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 516 (1996) (discussing commercial changes
in Pakistan).
129. The exception is Nigeria, whose formal institutions have actually deteriorated, and in
which personal relations, especially with the military, are far more important in terms of enforcing an
agreement than is the law. See supra text accompanying note 103.
130. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming January 1999).
131. See Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Framework for Analysis, in SOCIAL
RULES: ORIGIN; CHARACTER; LOGIC; CHANGE 189, 192 (David Braybrooke ed., 1996) (noting that
"the process of institutional change is overwhelmingly incremental"); Oran Young, Regime Dynamics:
The Rise and Fall of International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 277, 280 (1982) ("[l']t is exceedingly
difficult to bring about planned or guided changes in complex institutions.").
132. See Karl M. Meessen, Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1647, 1647 (1995) ("Times of transition are times of corruption.").
133. Privatization in transition economies provides a well discussed example of this problem.
"In two years the Russian privatization program has moved from the outstanding accomplishments of
the [Mass Privatization Program] to the point where the program is now widely regarded as collusive
and corrupt. . . ." Ira Lieberman & Rogi Veimetra, The Rush for State Shares in the "Klondyke" of
Wild East Capitalism: Loans for Shares Transactions in Russia, 29 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
737, 738 (1996); see Karla W. Simon, Privatization of Social and Cultural Services in Central and
Eastern Europe: Comparative Experiences, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 383, 390 (1995) (discussing the
difficulty of operating privatization programs to avoid corruption). Indeed, the Russian Interior
Ministry attributed a 41.2 percent increase in bribery and extortion among bureaucrats in 1992 to the
new privatization program. See Kent F. Moore, The Failure of Russian Privatization 1992-1994: How
the Industrial Nomenklatura Prevented Genuine Reform, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 39 n.115 (1997).
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to outside manipulation.1 4  Indeed, the corruption of newly-created
institutions-often by outsiders-has had a measurable negative effect on
persons in some of the transition economies, often causing them to embrace
less desirable alternatives.'3
Placing the responsibility for regulating transnational bribery in newly-
created institutions is not likely to be effective. Many of these new
institutions take the form of government agencies and bureaucracies that-as
likely targets for bribes-would be asked to police themselves. Even under
optimal conditions, self-policing is a difficult task.3 6 These institutions are
new, inexperienced, and vulnerable, making the task of self-policing even
more difficult.
The weakness of some host country institutions exacerbates another
difficulty inherent in combating transnational bribery-the fact that the
authorization of a bribe may occur thousands of miles away from the receipt
of a bribe.'37 Nascent, inexperienced government agencies cannot be
expected to locate, investigate, and extradite bribe authorizers situated far
beyond their borders.'35 Indeed, this reason alone militates in favor of
multilateral efforts to proscribe transnational bribery.'39
134. See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment: The E'perience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 27
(1995) (noting lack of experience and structure in dealing with foreign investors may promote
corruption in the host country).
135. See Janine Hiller & Snjezana Puselj Drezga, Progress and Challenges of Privatization:
The Croatian Experience, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 383, 407 (1996) (reporting a survey in Croatia
in which the vast majority of respondents recognized and condemned corruption in privatization); see
also Meessen, supra note 132, at 1647 ("Corruption both in government and in private business has
no little role in discrediting freshly installed democratic procedures and freshly installed free market
systems.").
136. See Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the
Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 57, 83 (1992) (noting that self-policing
is unreliable in the context of government officials tempted by other sources of income). The
difficulties of self-policing prompted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to
find a right of judicial review in the Freedom of Records Act, on the grounds that judicial oversight
would counter the agencies' "built-in incentive to dispose of records relating to 'mistakes.'" American
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Indeed, Congress itself later
explicitly recognized the need for judicial review in order to prevent "the anomalous situation...
whereby an agency head has a duty to initiate action to recover records which he himself has
removed." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-1124, at 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3894,
3903.
137. See David Wilson, Globalization and the Changing U.S. City: Dimensions of
Transformation, 551 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 8, 8 (1997) (noting that globalization has
led to decisions being made thousands of miles away from where they will take effect).
138. Indeed, the most successful prosecutions of transnational bribery occur when the
transaction is criminalized on both ends and both prosecuting governments cooperate with one
another. See Scott F. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for U.S. and
International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1999, 2023-24 (1996).
139. See HEIMANN, supra note 5, at 6 ("If we are serious about controlling corruption, it is
essential that control be applied from both ends."); Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption:
Focus on Latin America, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 179, 179-80 (1996) (reporting belief of the
Organization of American States that transnational bribery can only be controlled through international
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B. Host Country Agencies May Be Corrupted
Placing the responsibility for regulating transnational bribery on the
host country not only burdens nascent institutions, it may also place the
decision to prosecute bribery in the hands of those who accept the bribes.
Corrupt environments tend to drive out honest bureaucrats, leaving only
those who engage in bribe-taking. 4 ° Indeed, in some corrupt systems
positions within the bureaucracy are illicitly sold by superiors, thus
effectively screening out those whose integrity would disallow the payment
of bribes. 4 '
Obviously, "the very factors that encourage corruption prevent any
major reforms from taking place."' 42 A study of judicial reform in Latin
America, for example, found that factors related to corruption in the court
system contributed to political inertia in dealing with corruption and
bribery.'43 A corrupted system cannot, by itself, effectively regulate
transnational bribery.
C. Codes of Conduct Are By Themselves Not Sufficient
As a globalized, transnational phenomenon, transnational bribery must
be approached through a variety of institutions and policies. Voluntary
corporate codes of conduct certainly have value in controlling endemic
transnational corruption.'" Such codes by themselves, however, are not
efforts); Robin Theobold, Lancing the Swollen African State: Will it Alleviate the Problem of
Corruption?, 32 J. MODERN APR. STUD. 701, 706 (1994) (suggesting that the control of transnational
bribery requires international coordination).
140. See Johnson, supra note 98, at 57.
141. See Robert Wade, The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at
Development, 13 WORLD DEv. 467, 474-80 (1985) (describing the sale of government positions with
regard to irrigation). The existence-or even predominance-of a corrupted administrative system
must not be mistaken for evidence of cultural acceptance of bribery. One of the more interesting days
that the author of this Article has had occurred in a transition economy where the author was
interviewing a number of businesspersons (about a subject other than corruption). In the course of the
interviews, most businesspersons expressed frustration with and great disapproval of bribe-taking by
government officials. Young friends of the author's translator heaped scorn upon government officials
who accepted bribes. A courtesy call to a prominent government official at the end of the day,
however, took the author into a completely different world, in which the government official, using
clever but very enthusiastic euphemisms, embraced bribery and suggested that it was simply a part of
doing business in that country.
142. Werlin, supra note 118, at 84.
143. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 POL'Y
STUD. 273, 276 (1996); see also Marjit Sugata & Heling Shi, On Controlling Crime with Corrupt
Officials, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163, 171 (1998) (demonstrating that if the probability of
detection is based on the efforts of a corrupt official then crime cannot be controlled).
144. See Mark B. Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the
Henhouse?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 399, 406 (1993) (suggesting that voluntary codes are
valuable with respect to bribery).
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sufficient, and simply complement the criminalization of transnational
bribery.
Voluntary codes are particularly useful in two different circumstances.
The first is when the laws of a host country provide little guidance with
respect to or actually facilitate acts contrary to the laws or moral standards
of the home country. Apartheid and child labor may be two areas in which
such conflicts arise.' 45 Clearly, however, transnational bribery does not fall
within this category. Every nation in the world prohibits the bribery of its
officials, and these laws do not conflict with the laws or social norms of host
countries. "'
The second circumstance is when a company must guide its employees
in their compliance with laws imposed on the company.' 47 The use of
corporate codes in this fashion holds much promise. Unfortunately, the laws
are not yet all in place; absent the criminalization of transnational bribery by
home countries, such codes will not be completely anchored.
In addition to guiding employees in compliance with the law, voluntary
codes are likely to be of use to corporations with respect to payments that
are legal in a host country, but that may appear unsavory to the company.
Commonplace examples include the giving of gifts or promotional trips.
Although legal both in the host and therefore in the home country, a
company may find benefit in providing guidance to its employees with
respect to payments that it does not wish to make.
While voluntary codes may prove valuable in regulating transnational
bribery, their limits must be recognized. By themselves, such codes would
not prove effective. First, and most obviously, such codes only reach
corporations. 4 ' Bribery, however, while committed by corporations, is not a
crime that is limited to corporations.
Second, the incentives to commit transnational bribery may overwhelm
a voluntary code. Fritz Heimann concisely sets out the incentives to bribe:
"For corrupt companies, paying bribes is an effective way to win orders.
Bribery provides a way to beat competitors who have better technology or
lower costs. The cost of bribes can often be built into selling prices ....
The damage done by corruption hurts others, not the corrupt parties."
1 49
145. See Lance Compa & Tasbia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor
Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 665-69 (1995)
(discussing the codes of various companies).
146. See NOONAN, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that bribery is universally proscribed).
147. See Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. Rnv. 341, 366 (1991) (discussing this use); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 78 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1637 (1990) (same).
148. And most probably only those corporations large enough to bear the cost of generating
such codes. See Pitt & Groskaufinanis, supra note 147, at 422 (noting the very high cost of generating
corporate codes).
149. Heimann, supra note 10, at 147.
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Moreover, because bribery is illegal in the host country, it will be
hidden from the casual observer. 5 ' Weighed against inchoate reputational
benefits, companies will have a strong incentive to cheat. Indeed, the lack of
enforcement is the source of longstanding criticism of voluntary codes.'
Voluntary codes and host country regulation are valuable but are not
the sole answers. Given the weak institutions surrounding and often caused
by transnational bribery, and given the real harm caused by transnational
bribery, a more aggressive and more comprehensive approach is a better and
more viable policy choice. Indeed, Professor Salbu concludes his article with
a reference to Robert Lieken's discussion of means to control transnational
bribery.' Lieken does, as Salbu points out, suggest that host country
reform is an important component of an anti-bribery strategy.'53 Lieken goes
on, however, to emphasize the need for criminalization of transnational
bribery, and flatly states that "the solution to transnational bribery lies not in
a futile attempt to repeal the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act but in
universalizing it and supporting reforms in emerging countries."' 54
V. HOME COUNTRY REGULATION IS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL
OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY -
The observable facts are as follows: a growing number of commercial
transactions are transnational in nature; globalization offers benefits to all;
there is no supranational agency that can create or enforce transnational
regulations; transnational bribery is widespread and possibly growing; and
transnational bribery is extremely harmful. There is a very strong suspicion
that the explosion in transnational bribery is attributable in part to bribe
offers from foreign investors, and there is a very strong argument that host
country agencies cannot effectively regulate transnational bribery. Given
these facts and observations, home country regulation is both pragmatically
and morally mandated.
Home country regulation of transnational bribery has proven effective
in the United States. Home country regulation of transnational bribery is
150. See HEIMANN, supra note 5, at 7.
151. See Janice R. Bellace, The European Works Council Directive: Transnational
Information and Consultation in the European Union, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 325, 347 (1997) (noting
the "lack of enforcement" criticism). Indeed, even the Sullivan Principles-the voluntary codes of
conduct adopted by companies to deal with the very unpopular practice of apartheid in South Africa-
were so ineffective that they were replaced by laws prohibiting most types of business relations with
the apartheid government. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 145, at 666-67.
152. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 255 n.182 (citing Robert S. Lieken, Controlling the Global
Corruption Epidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1996-97, at 55, 68).
153. See Lieken, supra note 152, at 67.
154. Id. at 71. Lieken lauds the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and
proposes that its reach be expanded beyond the region. See id. at 73; see also supra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text (discussing the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption).
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also legal with respect to international rules concerning extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Finally, home country regulation of transnational bribery does
not constitute "moral imperialism," and in fact may be the most moral
approach to the phenomenon of transnational bribery.
A. Home Country Regulation Is Effective
The United States's experience with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
empirically supports the proposition that home country regulation is
effective. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has had a definite effect on the
behavior of U.S. domestic concerns in their conduct of transnational
business. United States businesspersons share their foreign counterparts'
sometimes mercenary attitude toward the payments of bribes.' Nonetheless,
a survey of U.S. businesspersons indicated that very few authorized or paid
bribes to foreign officials." 6 Almost half of those same businesspersons
indicated that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a "very important" or
"extremely important" factor in trade.' $7 Indeed, the complaints lodged
against the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by U.S. businesses indicate, albeit
anecdotally, that the law must have some impact on those businesses'
behavior.
The superior effectiveness of home country to host country regulation
makes sense. Globalization has obviously affected the nature and structure of
corporations.'58 Nonetheless, there is no global or transcendent means of
creating a corporation-it must be created somewhere and it must exist
somewhere.'59 Similarly, a corporate officer may never visit the country in
which he or she has authorized the offer or payment of a bribe, but the
officer must live somewhere and must keep assets someplace. It is the
155. See Justin G. Longenecker et al., The Ethical Issue of International Bribery: A Study of
Attitudes Among U.S. Business Professionals, 7 J. Bus. ETtics 341, 343 (1988) (reporting that
slightly over half of the businesspersons surveyed responded that bribing foreign officials is always or
sometimes acceptable).
156. See JYOTI N. PRASAD, IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTIcEs ACT OF 1977 ON
U.S. EXPORTS 142 (1993) (reporting that only 4.1 percent of the persons surveyed indicated that they
had paid or authorized such bribes); see also Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in U.S. Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DEcIsION EcON. 295, 301 (1991) (discussing the
effects of the Act).
157. See PRASAD, supra note 156, at 121 (reporting that 44.6 percent of businesspersons
surveyed responded that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a "very important" or "extremely
important" factor affecting U.S. export trade).
158. See Philip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 285 (1990) (discussing the nature of "worldwide integrated enterprises").
159. For a discussion of the proposed European Corporate Statute, see Terence L.
Blackhurst, The Societas Europa: The Evolving European Corporate Statute, 61 FORDHAM L. Ry.
695, 772 (1993). Blackhurst notes-the failure of the Commission of the European Community to
"create a special European form of business enterprise that differs markedly from national forms of
business enterprise." Id.
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jurisdiction of the corporation's residence and assets that will have real
leverage over the officer.
Arguments against the effectiveness of home country prohibition of
transnational bribery usually use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as their
model. The major criticisms are that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
too vague, and that it either does not inhibit illicit activity or inhibits so
much illicit activity that it makes U.S. businesses uncompetitive.
1. Vagueness
Several persons, both proponents and detractors of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, have at least tacitly suggested that the Act is vague.16 The
most significant problem associated with vagueness is that the Act does not
create a bright line that divides allowable conduct from prohibited conduct,
and thus possibly chills what might be legitimate business activity."' This
problem may not be a problem at all. Bribery is such a harmful practice that
chilling activity that is so close to bribery as to make it difficult to tell
whether it is or is not bribery may be beneficial. 62 It is interesting to note
that the multinational efforts to criminalize transnational bribery have
adopted definitions of bribery that are more comprehensive and far-reaching
than the definition used in the United States's Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act."' Apparently, the countries negotiating these agreements, many of
which have long suffered corruption, find benefit in broad definitions of
bribery."
Even if the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is too vague-indeed, even
if the language in that Act is completely unworkable-that does not indict
criminalization of transnational bribery. It simply means that the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act is poorly written. A statute criminalizing transnational
bribery need not mimic the United States's legislation. The criminalization
of transnational bribery, not the exact replication of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, is what will accrue the benefits suggested in this Article.
160. See, e.g., David A. Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Professional and Ethical
Challenges for Lawyers, 14 Aiuz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 111-15 (1997) (presenting hypothetical
situations arising under the FCPA that highlight "gray areas" in the statute); Rossbacher & Young,
supra note 89, at 525 ("The Act . . . continues to suffer from vagueness that hinders its
effectiveness."). It should be noted that Gantz believes that ascertaining additional facts often clarifies
"gray areas," and that the Department of Justice's new policy of issuing no-action letters will obviate
problems of vagueness. See Gantz, supra, at 98, 109-10.
161. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 262-63.
162. See supra Section II.B (discussing the harms caused by bribery).
163. See Low et al., supra note 53, at 264 (noting that the Inter-American Convention
reaches more behavior than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Zedalis, supra note 52, at 51 (noting
that the OAS Convention reaches more behavior than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
164. Cf. Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 127 (1997) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's overly narrow definition of
corruption in the campaign finance law context).
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For example, a very good argument has been made that the local law
exception to the U.S. Act does not accomplish what it should accomplish. 165
The exception states that payments that are "lawful under the written laws
and regulations" of a host country are not actionable under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act." As written, however, the exception requires an
affirmative statement that the payment is in fact allowable. The vast majority
of laws, however, simply state what payments are not allowable. The lack of
affirmative language guts the exception.' 67
The solution is relatively simple. A statute criminalizing transnational
bribery could simply state that only payments prohibited by the laws of the
host country will be actionable under the statute. This construction
accommodates differences among countries by using the prohibitory
language of each country rather than positing nonexistent affirmative
language. At the same time, it retains the benefits of home country
prohibition of transnational bribery.
To the extent that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is vague, it is
vague. Whether or not that is good or bad, it is certainly irrelevant to a
discussion of criminalization of transnational bribery. In fact, if the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act is indeed overly vague, then it can serve as a lesson to
those in other countries who draft legislation prohibiting transnational
bribery.
2. Failure and Uncompetitiveness
The arguments that the U.S. laws against transnational bribery do not
inhibit transnational bribery and that they render U.S. companies
uncompetitive clearly contradict each other. The contradictory nature of
these arguments and their anecdotal roots indicate their lack of soundness.
Indeed, the empirical evidence, as discussed above, supports the idea that
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has circumscribed the behavior of U.S.
businesses abroad. 6 Nonetheless, these arguments merit brief discussion in
the context of prohibitions on transnational bribery, which is different than
the context of the U.S. law.
The U.S. law has been violated, and as other countries enact laws
prohibiting transnational bribery, those laws too will be violated. Since its
inception in 1978, sixteen bribery allegations, involving seventeen
companies and thirty-three individuals, have been prosecuted under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.'69 By contrast, 1996 alone saw the
165. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 279-80.
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), 78dd-2(c) (1994).
167. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 279-80.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 155-157.
169. See William Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of Almost 21venty
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commission of 19,645 murders and non-negligent manslaughters in the
United States, and 95,769 forcible rapes. 7 Securities laws were violated,
antitrust laws were violated, fraud was committed. People and businesses do
break laws, but the existence of those laws inhibits countless others from
engaging in the proscribed activity. The standard for an effective law cannot
be that it is never violated. 171 Using that metric, virtually no law in the entire
world would be considered viable.
The converse argument, that the U.S. prohibition is so effective that it
renders U.S. firms less "competitive" 72 than firms not bound by the
prohibition, probably has more validity. It is likely that the U.S. law has
caused U.S. companies to ldse contracts that they otherwise should have
won-although the data on uncompetitiveness is somewhat unclear,173 and it
is not certain whether the U.S. companies would have deserved to win the
contracts if they had diverted resources from quality in order to pay bribes.
United States companies would also be more competitive if they were
allowed to beat any person who refused to award them contracts, or if they
could kill their competitors. 74 There is a short-term benefit to breaking the
rules, but to suggest that businesses therefore have the right to break rules is
nonsensical.
Moreover, a lack of competitiveness is predicated on the fact that other
countries do not outlaw transnational bribery. As other countries enact
similar laws, that noncompetitive effect will be mitigated.175 Indeed, Paula
Years, 1 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. (Bus. L. Inc.) 102, 102.004 (1998).
170. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFoRM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 1996, at 13, 23 (1997).
171. The argument that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is ineffective because it has not
curtailed bribery worldwide merits almost no response. The majority of transnational transactions do
not involve the United States or U.S. businesses. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot be
expected to reach those transactions. The fact that incidents of bribery have increased in the face of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is not an indictment of that Act but instead highlights the need for
other countries to enact similar laws.
172. Competitive in the sense of beating competition to win business rather than competitive
in the sense of offering high quality goods or services at low prices.
173. See Kate Gillespie, Middle East Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
CAL. MGMT. REv., Summer 1987, at 9, 28 (concluding that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act's
"potential to hurt U.S. exports remains unproved").
174. There are businesspersons who use violence, and it does give them an advantage.
"When organized crime moves into a business, it usually brings to that venture all the techniques of
violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. Competitors can be effectively
eliminated and customers can be effectively confined to sponsored suppliers." 115 CONG. REc. 5874
(1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan). In the context of emerging economies, Bernard Black, Reinier
Kraakman, and Jonathan Hay suggest that an effective means of enforcing shareholder rights would be
for shareholders to shoot directors who violate clear rules. See Bernard Black et al., Corporate Law
From Scratch 21-22 (Dec. 15-16, 1994) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on
Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, on file with author).
175. See JEFFREY P. BIALOS & GREGORY HUSISIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
COPING WITH CORRUI'TION IN TRANsITION ECONOMIES 164 (1996) (suggesting that once other
countries criminalize transnational bribery such legislation will not cause disadvantage to U.S.
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Stern and Alexander Koff suggest that the better means of leveling the
playing field is for all countries to criminalize transnational bribery-better
economically because it helps developing countries avoid deadweight loss,
better politically because it helps economies in transition, and better morally
because it underscores the fact that companies will not pay bribes.1
76
At bottom, there may be a short-term cost to a country's economy for
playing by the rules. If so, that is a cost that should be borne. As a
Department of Justice official noted at the inception of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, "Compliance with the new act may not be costless for the
United States. But living up to one's principles rarely is."
177
B. Criminalization of Transnational Bribery Comports with International
Law
More often than not, criminalization of transnational bribery will reach
conduct that occurs outside the territory of the home country. 178 Although
extraterritorial application of criminal law is somewhat controversial, it is
well within the bounds of what is permitted by international law. The United
States's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act again serves as a model. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act only proscribes the activities of "domestic concerns,"
meaning U.S. citizens and permanent residents, U.S. corporations and other
business entities, or any officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder
working on their behalf.
179
Limiting the proscription to domestic concerns comports with the
"nationality principle" as a means of extending jurisdiction beyond a
country's physical boundaries. The nationality principle holds that a country
has jurisdiction over the behavior of its citizens, and that its jurisdiction
follows those citizens when they travel outside of the country's
boundaries. 1 0 For purposes of the nationality principle, citizens include
business entities as well as natural persons. 1 '
businesses).
176. See Paula Stern & Alexander W. Koff, Policing Illicit U.S. Business Actions Overseas,
18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 679, 680 (1997) (book review).
177. Philip B. Heymann, Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Violators of Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1979, at 8, 10.
178. It is possible, of course, that bribes could be offered to foreign government officials
while those officials were physically within the territory of the home country.
179. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (1994);
see also Gantz, supra note 160, at 105 (1997) (discussing "domestic concerns").
180. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (4th ed. 1990)
(discussing the nationality principle); OSCAR SCHIACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 254 (1991) (analyzing the nationality principle); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 968 (1991) (stating that Congress's legislative power follows the
flag and every U.S. citizen).
181. See Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact
of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 66, 104 (1993) ("Under
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Extension of jurisdiction through the nationality principle is not
controversial." 2 Indeed, the nationality principle has been used by a variety
of international and domestic tribunals to justify the application of criminal
law to acts that occur outside of the territory of the proscribing country." 3
Professor Salbu has criticized the application of the nationality
principle by the United States with respect to its laws on transnational
bribery because these laws apply to employees and agents of U.S. businesses
even if these employees and agents are not citizens or residents of the United
States."84 According to Salbu, the inclusion of employees and agents renders
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act "highly'invasive." 85
This argument is curious because it raises the question of how the
nationality principle could possibly be an effective means of extending
jurisdiction if it did not apply to employees and agents. If, for example, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act excused the conduct of noncitizens or
nonresidents, then the means of circumventing the Act would be clear-
simply hire foreign persons to make decisions and take action regarding
bribes." 6 Courts have the power to assert jurisdiction over agents and
employees simply because they are a part of the company over which the
court has jurisdiction. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court
pointed out, "judicial power hardly oversteps the bounds when it refuses to
lend its aid to a promotional project which would circumvent or undermine a
legislative policy." "7
the 'nationality principle' of jurisdiction, the United States may regulate the overseas conduct of its
nationals, including corporations.").
182. See BROWNL1E, supra note 180, at 303 (noting that there is no real objection to the
nationality principle). Use of the nationality principle to regulate the behavior of foreign subsidiaries
of home country corporations is, however, somewhat controversial. See Allan E. Gottlieb,
Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. ITrr'L L. & Bus. 449, 455 (1983) (criticizing
the United States for extending jurisdiction to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations).
183. See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (approving
jurisdiction based on the nationality principle); In re Di Lisi, 7 I.L.R. 193 (Italy Cass. 1934) (basing
jurisdiction on the nationality principle); X v. Public Prosecutor, 19 I.L.R. 226 (Neth. HR 1952)
(basing jurisdiction on the nationality principle); The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (Sept. 7) (applying the nationality principle).
184. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 278-79; Salbu, supra note 89, at 254.
185. Salbu, supra note 9, at 279. Professor Salbu's criticism seems not to be echoed by
persons actually in host countries. This silence respecting the use of the nationality principle to extend
jurisdiction over agents and employees stands in marked contrast to the criticism of its use to assert
jurisdiction over subsidiaries. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 182, at 455 (noting that "[c]orporations
are creatures of domestic law, and the logic of domestic law supports the view that United States
legislation cannot repeatedly invoke the nationality principle for jurisdiction with regard to foreign
corporations"). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act does not apply to foreign subsidiaries, although
parents are liable for their subsidiaries' acts. See C Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. Rv. 1, 2 (1998).
186. Punishing the corporation for the acts of these employees or agents would indirectly
assert control over their actions and thus would be "invasive."
187. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 366 (1944). The Court goes on to say that "[i]f the
judicial power is helpless to protect a legislative program from schemes for easy avoidance, then
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Criminalization of transnational bribery is permissible under the rules
of international law. The nationality principle is accepted by all as a means
of asserting criminal jurisdiction, and its use to regulate the conduct of
nationals outside the territory of the home country does not constitute an
affront to the host country.
C. Home Country Regulation of Transnational Bribery Is Necessary to
Preserve the Benefits of Specialization
The theory of comparative advantage suggests that all countries benefit
when each produces what it is most efficient at producing. Such
specialization allows all of the world's resources to be used in the most
efficient manner. 8 Specialization, however, requires relatively free trade
among countries, so that each is able to acquire from the others what it itself
does not produce.8 9
Transnational bribery clearly acts as a barrier to free trade. A bribe
request is different from a tariff only because it also invokes costs associated
with keeping the payment secret. 9 ' Bribery is also used to create de facto
monopolies that preclude trade with nonmembers. 9'
Globalization facilitates the creation of commercial relations with little
regard for national boundaries. Commercial relations, however, occur in the
context of institutions, of which law is an important example. To the extent
that home country regulation of transnational bribery effectively inhibits
such bribery, home country regulation can become an important factor in
creating institutional support for a phenomenon that promises benefits for
many.
D. Gift-Giving Practices Do Not Militate Against Prohibitions on
Transnational Bribery
In the current debate, Professor Salbu focuses not on the bulk of
behaviors that clearly constitute bribery but instead on those behaviors at the
"borderline" between legal and illegal conduct."' 2 Salbu illustrates his
indeed it has become a handy implement of high finance." Id. The Court speaks, of course, of
piercing the corporate veil, but the underlying rationale is applicable.
188. See ROOT, supra note 27, at 38.
189. See Sykes, supra note 27, at 199.
190. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 119, at 42 (noting that "the need to pay bribes is an
entry barrier"); Ruth Wedgwood, Stop the Greedy "Kleptokrats", WASH. PosT, June 4, 1996, at A17
(referring to bribery as "the ultimate non-tariff barrier to trade").
191. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1989)
(characterizing monopolies created through bribery as inefficient).
192. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 234.
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argument with examples of gift-giving behavior193 and acts undertaken with
multiple motives."'
The observation of a gray area is not novel. In his own discussion of
the differences between gifts and bribes, John Noonan observes that in
"[i]ntermediate cases, borderline cases exist. What moral concept is free of
them? Gray depends on black and white."'95 Judge Noonan goes on,
however, to state that "the difficulty of judgment does not destroy the moral
nature of the concept being employed. "196 Professor Salbu's reasons for
allowing the gray to subsume the black and white fall into two categories:
distinguishing between actionable and acceptable behavior is made more
difficult by cultural differences,197 and ignoring cultural differences incurs
perils. 9 ' The former category is discussed in this Section, the latter in
Section V.E.
As is often the case when the parts are allowed to overwhelm the
whole, the discussion of gifts overstates the matter. Based on the fact that an
automotive company prohibited its employees from accepting gifts,
193. See id. at 234-40. Salbu discusses the symbolic value of gifts, specifically the notion that
one understands the business needs of another, see id. at 236-37; the etiquette role of gifts, and the
concomitant role in relationships, see id. at 237-38; and the role of gifts in entertainment and
hospitality, particularly with respect to eating, see id. at 238-40. The sociological study of gifts dates
back at least to the seminal works of Marcel Mauss and Bransislaw Malinowski, see BRANISLAW
MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC: AN AccouNT OF NATIVE ENTERPRISE AND
ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES OF MELANESIAN NEW GUINEA (1922); MARCEL MAUSS, THE
GIFT: FoRMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCIANGE IN ARCHAIC SocITms (Ian Cunnison trans., W.W.
Norton 1967) (1923), although in legal scholarship discussions of gift-giving tend to focus on contract
or tax issues, see, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
CAL. L. REV. 821, 823-24 & n.14 (1997) (defining the term "world of gift" and distinguishing it
from "world of contract"); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the
Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1, 28-38 (1992) (discussing gifts and arguing that they
are income). But see Medrith Lee Hager, Note, The Hobbs Act: Maintaining the Distinction Between
a Bribe and a Gift, 83 Ky. L.J. 197, 199-200 (1995) (discussing the difference between a gift and a
bribe).
194. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 248-51.
195. NOONAN, supra note 83, at 698. Professor Salbu's contrasting of bribery with torture, in
which he finds "a lack of moral ambiguity" and speculates that "middle-ground cases are hard to
imagine," is overly simplistic. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 233 n.59. It is quite simple to find
disagreement. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, upheld a refusal to extradite a
German national to the United States on the grounds that forcing the defendant to face the death
penalty would constitute a cruel violation of human rights, see Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No.
14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 478 (1989), whereas the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that the death penalty does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976). The caning of Michael Fay in Singapore highlighted the debate over
corporal punishment. See Firouzeh Bahrampour, Note, The Caning of Michael Fay: Can Singapore's
Punishment Withstand the Scrutiny of International Law?, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1075,
1089-93 (1995) (describing the debate). The fact that the boundaries of torture are not as clear-cut as
Salbu describes should not detract from efforts to proscribe torture. It simply supports Noonan's
point, and points to the fact that bribery is hardly unique in having a gray area.
196. NOONAN, supra note 83, at 698.
197. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 240-41.
198. See id. at 226-27.
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Professor Salbu states that "never before in [U.S.] history has the practice of
gift-giving come under such stringent scrutiny."' 9 9 He then goes on to imply
that persons in the United States draw no distinction between gifts and
bribes.2ec Of course, this is not true. John Noonan, a distinguished U.S.
scholar and jurist, writes eloquently of the distinction between a gift and a
bribe, noting that a gift "is given in a context created by a personal relations
to convey a personal feeling" and concluding that a gift-giver "does not give
by way of compensation or by way of purchase."2"' Nor are U.S. courts
incapable of distinguishing between gifts, which may represent "vague
expectation of future benefits," and bribes given "in return for some act of
official grace."202 Moreover, gift-giving has not vanished from either the
general0 3 or corporate culture of the United States; indeed, corporate gift-
giving remains a vibrant part of U.S. business life.2"4 Clearly, the
implication that persons in the United States do not understand gifts as "a
form of common courtesy or a component of expected relational etiquette"2"
or that the U.S. "cultural lens" cannot distinguish between gifts and bribes is
unsupportable.
Similarly, Professor Salbu's depiction of gift-giving outside the United
States may paint too stark a picture. For example, he discusses the tradition
of chonji in Korea, pursuant to which a person seeking a favor of another
person offers a gift before asking for the favor.20 ' In its traditional form,
however, gifts given pursuant to chonji are meant only as tokens of respect,
and do not create an obligation by the recipient to misuse his or her office.
Only the most superficial examination of chonji would lead to confusion
199. Salbu, supra note 89, at 234. Salbu refers to a policy at Opel forbidding employees from
accepting gifts from suppliers. See id. at 234 n.60. He also refers to a policy at Dell Computer
forbidding employees from accepting gifts from outside counsel. See id. at 234 n.62.
200. See id. at 234. Judge Noonan acknowledges that there are persons who adhere to this
extreme thinking, but derides it: "The distinctions on which civilized conduct depends disappear in a
raw reductionism." NOONAN, supra note 83, at 695.
201. NOONAN, supra note 83, at 695.
202. United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1982); see also United States v.
Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that a gift must be offered with something
more specific than a generalized expectation of ultimate benefit in order to be actionable as a bribe).
203. A very interesting scholarly exchange concerning holiday gifts illustrates the fact that
gifts remain a vital part of U.S. culture. Compare Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas,
83 AM. EcON. REv. 1328, 1336 (1993) (stating that in 1992, $38 billion was spent on holiday gifts
and calculating that up to one third of that amount was deadweight loss), with Sara J. Solnick & David
Hemenway, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, 86 AM. EcON. REV. 1299, 1305 (1996)
(countering that people value a gift for reasons not necessarily reflected in the gift's price).
204. See Tricia Campbell, Tips for Better Giving, SALES & MARKETING MGMT., Sept. 1997,
at 81, 81 (reporting that 54 percent of companies surveyed believed gift-giving "effective" and 14
percent believed gift-giving "very effective" in creating business relations); Hillary Feder, Solving the
Gift-Giving Puzzle, POTENTIALS IN MARKETING, July 1998, at 20, 20 (reporting that nearly $1.8
billion is spent each year on business gifts in the United States).
205. Salbu, supra note 89, at 234.
206. See id. at 235.
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between traditional chonji and bribery." 7 Salbu also discusses the traditional
gift-giving practices of the Navajo. 8 Again, however, the traditional
exchange of gifts is largely limited to relatives and indicates only esteem. 09
It is difficult to argue that the practice is intended to encompass gifts
conferred in order to induce an official to abuse his or her office.210
Ultimately, Professor Salbu's discussion of gifts is unsatisfying for
three reasons. First, his discussion does not prove its own point. With one
exception, he never demonstrates that any of the gifts described would be
considered bribes under Western law.2" Nor does Professor Salbu
demonstrate that any of the gifts described would not be considered bribes in
any of the countries in which they are bestowed.212 The one exception is
illuminating-Professor Salbu describes two Navajo leaders removed from
office for accepting bribes. The determination that these men accepted
bribes, however, was made not by Western courts applying Western law but
instead by Navajo courts applying Navajo law2 -a determination that
Western courts would probably agree with. Absent a demonstration that the
courts of various cultures would make different determinations, Professor
207. Professor Salbu does refer to an editorial in a newspaper in which the editorialist
laments the deterioration of chonji into bribery. See id. at 235 n.72 (citing Agenda for a New Leader,
AsuwEEK, Mar. 13, 1998, at 14). Similarly, Salbu refers to a very commendable student note to
support his claim of a "cultural rift" between Asia and the West. Id. at 235 n.71 (citing Daniel Y.
Jun, Note, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to a Cultural Ritual and Restoring Honor,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1071, 1084 (1996)). Jun's note acknowledges Korea's communal
orientation and the importance of gift-giving, but goes on to state that the "Korean people share the
same moral standards as the Western culture regarding bribery. They are equally capable of
distinguishing between what is intended to be gratuitous and what is intended to wrongfully influence
another person." Jun, supra, at 1084-85.
208. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 243-45.
209. Cf. BERARD HAiLE, PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF THE NAVAJO INDIANS 42 (1954) ("Friends
exchange presents in tokens of esteem and women make presents of especially nice weaves to male
relatives."). Haile observed this practice "only among older people." Id.
210. Indeed, the practice almost certainly predates the modern form of Navajo government,
which came into existence in the 1940s. See DAVID E. WILKINS, DINE BIBEEAZ',AANI: A HANDBOOK
OF NAVAJO GOVERNMENT 52-53 (describing the creation of the modern Navajo government).
211. In most cases, such an argument could not be made. For example, a search of several
electronic databases revealed no cases in which a person was prosecuted for offering an official a
dinner.
212. In fact, several indigenous authors suggest that payments made under the guise of
traditional gift-giving do in fact constitute actionable bribery. See, e.g., Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988
Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulations Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 179, 224-25 (stating that a strong tradition of gift-giving is used by some
politicians as cover for the receipt of bribes); Jun, supra note 207, at 1085 (stating that "bribery has
become a cultural ritual only in the sense that it is a prevalent practice, but not in the sense that it is a
morally accepted practice" and explicating "how the Korean law draws the line between legal and
illegal exchanges"); see also id. at 1084-97 (elaborating his discussion of gift-giving as a cover for
bribes).
213. See Timothy Egan, Another Leader of the Navajo Nation Resigns Under a Cloud, N.Y.
Timts, Feb. 20, 1998, at A12.
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Salbu's discussion scarcely demonstrates the "cultural rift"2 4 that he
professes.
Second, in describing the difficulty attendant to discerning bribery,
Professor Salbu confuses anecdote with judicial inquiry. Again, his Navajo
example is illustrative. Based on the statements of an ousted official as
reported in a single newspaper story, Salbu weaves a tale of a man
attempting to perform rituals for the terminally ill and valiantly clinging to
the traditions of the Din6.2  The action taken by the Navajo Nation against
the official, however, was not based on a single story in the Arizona
Republic but instead was the result of a six month investigation by a special
prosecutor."16 Similarly, any prosecutions under laws prohibiting
transnational bribery would go beyond a superficial treatment of the facts in
any given case. People would not go to jail on the basis of a one paragraph
hypothetical.
Third, Professor Salbu's discussion of gifts misses the point. The issue
involved in prohibitions of transnational bribery is not whether a payment
given in the host country would be considered bribery under the laws of the
home country had it been made in the home country. The issue is whether a
bribe was paid, under the laws of the host country, to an official of that host
country.
Courts throughout the world-including the United States-regularly
interpret and apply the laws of other countries.217 Procedural rules in both
common law25 and civil law2 9 countries allow judges to utilize a wide
variety of sources in discerning alien law.22 Various international
214. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 235.
215. See id. at 243-44 (citing Bill Donovan, Navajo "Gift Giving" "Is All Illegal Now",
ARiZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 7, 1998, at B1).
216. See Egan, supra note 213, at A12.
217. See Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and Interpretation of Foreign Law. A
Comparative Study in Private international Law, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 225, 225 (1995)
("Application, proof, and interpretation of foreign law are interrelated subjects that sit at the core of
international conflict of laws, or, as known in the civil law system, private international law.").
Dolinger points out that "German, Italian, Swiss, and Belgian case law and Austrian, Spanish, and
Greek statutory law all determine the ex officio application of foreign law," id. at 230, and notes that
France, for example, litigates an extensive amount of foreign law in its courts, see id. at 230-32.
218. See, e.g., FED. R. Ciees. P. 26.1 ("The court, in determining foreign law, may consider
any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under The Federal Rules of Evidence.").
219. See, e.g., Swiss Statute on Private International Law, art. 16, reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1244, 1256 (1990) ("The contents of foreign law shall be ascertained ex officio."). Dolinger notes that
"[t]he prevalent rule in continental law is that the judge may call upon the parties to help him discover
content and enforceability of the foreign applicable law. This has been established clearly by the
legislatures in countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece and Switzerland." Dolinger, supra note 217,
at 235 (citations omitted).
220. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of
Conflicts, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 602, 637-38 (1976) (discussing the use of information and opinions
supplied by comparative law centers).
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agreements also provide guidance.22' The commonplace of choice of law
provisions in contracts ensures that courts are forced to use these sources.'
Clearly, it cannot credibly be argued that courts are not accustomed to or
capable of interpreting the bribery laws of other countries." Interpreting
alien law may be more difficult than discerning domestic law, but courts
generally do not shirk their responsibilities simply because of difficulty.224
Indeed, Professor Salbu's discussion of gifts and other borderline
behavior is more paradoxical than persuasive. Salbu suggests that foreign
businesspersons learn intimately the nuanced behavior of the cultures with
which they do business and must act as does everyone else on the other side
of the "cultural rift"-implying that such behaviors can be learned. 5 At the
same time, he intimates that persons other than businesspersons are for some
reason incapable of learning that same behavior and can never cross the
"cultural rift."226 No reason is given for the difference in the learning
abilities of these two groups. This paradox in Salbu's exposition results
directly from his insistence that community must rigidly adhere to state
boundaries and his failure to recognize transnational communities.22
221. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law,
May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1231; see also Case of Brazilian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20, at
124 (July 12) ("Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to apply the municipal
law of a particular country... it must seek to apply it as it would be applied in that country.").
222. See Dolinger, supra note 217, at 246 (stating that the ability of parties to choose the law
to be applied to a contract "is presently accepted in practically all legal systems"); Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 293 n.175 (1990) ("The power of parties to rely
on foreign law with respect to interpreting their contract is uncontroversial."). Indeed, a European
Community convention requires that parties be allowed to choose foreign law in the interpretation of
their contracts. See Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19,
1980, art. 3, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 2.
223. Similarly, it is difficult to give credence to Professor Salbu's assertion that interpreting
alien bribery laws is "presumptuous and intrusive." Salbu, supra note 89, at 252.
224. Karl Llewellyn's famous admonition, although given in a different context, applies:
"The court must decide the dispute that is before it. It cannot refuse because the job is hard, or
dubious, or dangerous." K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 40
(1960). Commentators with less scholarly and more real-world interests agree. See Chicago Council
of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAutL L.
REv. 673, 777 (1994) ("One role of the courts is to decide difficult, often heated, disputes . . ").
Interestingly, Salbu's argument suggests that applying host country law may be easier for home
country courts. Salbu suggests that motive is important in bribery laws, and that discerning the motive
of a person is best accomplished by others from the same culture. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 241. If
Salbu's argument is correct, it would be easier for home country courts to ascertain the motives of
their countrymen than for host country courts examining the motives of foreign businesspersons. The
author of this Article repeats, however, that history suggests that both courts would be capable of
applying bribery laws.
225. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 235.
226. See id. at 252.
227. Salbu does recognize the possibility of some cultural diversity within a country, but
unequivocally posits that "states are today's primary global units of analysis." See Salbu, supra note
89, at 231.
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The fact that some cases are factually difficult does militate for the
prohibition of transnational bribery. Cases at "the borderline," which
present factual patterns that render bribery impossible to prove either will
not be prosecuted or will be lost by the prosecutor.22 At the same time, the
existence of a law prohibiting transnational bribery acts as a cautionary note
to those engaging in borderline activities not to push those activities too far,
thus avoiding the degradation of indigenous practices that Salbu's own
authorities lament.
E. Home Country Regulation of Transnational Bribery Is Moral
Home country regulation of transnational bribery is moral. Indeed,
home country regulation of transnational bribery may be morally required.
First, bribery has a very destructive effect on host countries. At least some,
and probably a great deal of, transnational bribery is initiated by foreign
businesspersons. The home countries of those businesspersons have the
ability to circumscribe the harmful behavior of their citizens and residents.
Not to exercise that power is an affront to the many persons harmed by
corruption.2 29
Second, globalization theoretically produces benefits for all.
Practically, however, most of the early benefits have been enjoyed by the
industrialized countries. At the same time, globalization has spread
corruption and its attendant harms to the emerging and developing countries.
The industrialized countries enjoy the benefits of globalization, while others
pay the cost. Such a construct is clearly exploitative.23°
Criminalization of transnational bribery is sometimes characterized as
"moral imperialism."231 Such an accusation, while striking a grand posture,
must be carefully examined. 32 In the first place, those making the accusation
are often persons in positions to accept bribes; z3 their statements must be
weighed against the mass of persons who do not accept bribery as a means
228. A point made by Salbu himself. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 248.
229. In essence, countries that do not proscribe the bribery of foreign public officials are
forcing other countries to shoulder externalities generated by the actions of the former countries'
citizens.
230. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 171 (1990) ("Persons are exploited
if (1) others secure a benefit by (2) using them as a tool or a resource so as (3) to cause them serious
harm.").
231. See Pines, supra note 93, at 204-05 n.123 (discussing such changes). Pines himself
finds the charge of moral imperialism meritless.
232. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 1, 9-10
(1992) ("The air is too thick these days with charges of... moral imperialism .... Though each of
these charges has a legitimate place, more often their invocation keeps the discussion from digging
deeper.")
233. Salbu cites a statement by the Minister of Trade of Indonesia. See Salbu, supra note 9,
at 276-77.
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of conducting business. Respecting cultural differences does not mean
respecting only the practices of the most corrupt level of a society." 4
In the second place, discussion of moral imperialism often grossly
mischaracterizes the prohibition of transnational bribery. Professor Salbu
states that the world "acknowledges cultural pluralism" with respect to
bribery.235 He is wrong. Every society in the world condemns the bribery of
its officials.236 What Salbu means to say, and what his examples attempt to
illustrate, is that different cultures might perceive different events to
constitute those universally condemned bribes.237 This is an important
distinction."5  It is important because Salbu's characterization of
transnational bribery prohibitions as "the ubiquitous transnational application
of.. . one set of laws" 9 is also wrong. A benefit conferred on an official
only constitutes bribery if the law dictates that the conferral is bribery. If the
law renders such a conferral lawful, then the conferral does not constitute
bribery. The prohibition of transnational bribery, therefore, must make
reference to local law, and in fact gives voice to that law by allowing for its
enforcement in the home country of a bribe-giving businessperson.240 An apt
comparison can be made with contract. The concept of contract exists in
each of common law, civil law, socialist law, and traditional law. 24I In each
of those legal systems, however, a contract is formed in different ways. A
U.S. court asked to determine whether a contract had been formed in
234. For an exposition of this precise point, see Hudson P. Rogers et al., Ethics and
Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries: A Social Contract Perspective, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 11, 20 (Nejdet Delener ed., 1995).
235. Salbu, supra note 89, at 231.
236. See HEIMANN, supra note 5, at 7 ("There is no country in the world where bribery is
either legally or morally acceptable.").
237. Salbu does not establish that the behavior described in his examples actually would be
considered bribery in any court. Nonetheless, it is probably true that various legal systems differ as to
events that constitute bribery.
238. Indeed, in his seminal work on international business ethics, Thomas Donaldson
emphasizes that in order for cultural relativism to be a valid construct, "some transcultural ethical
disagreements [must] exist such that their resolution cannot be achieved through the resolution of
factual misunderstandings." THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 18
(1989).
239. Salbu, supra note 89, at 231.
240. Even the inartfully drafted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the United States embraces
a plurality of laws by exempting from its reach those payments that are legal under host country law.
See supra text accompanying notes 166-167 (discussing the exemption and suggesting improvements
to its language).
241. See TALIM 0. ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 144-48 (1956)
(discussing contract in traditional African law); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & VICTOR P. MOZOLIN,
CONTRACT LAW IN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT (1987)
(describing and comparing concepts of contract in socialist and common law); BARRY NICHOLAS, THE
FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 34 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that "the philosophical, moral and economic
presuppositions [of contract] were the same on both sides of the channel"); B. TER HAAR, ADAT LAW
IN INDONESIA 128-43 (E. Adamson Hoebel & A. Arthur Schiller eds., 1948) (discussing types of
contracts or contract-like agreements formed in traditional Indonesian law).
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France, therefore, would be remiss in applying its own law and would
instead determine whether the parties had satisfied the French
requirements.
242
In the third place, an accusation as sanctimonious as "moral
imperialism" must be grounded in a clear definition of what in fact
constitutes moral imperialism. Absent such a definition, virtually any
transnational act becomes moral imperialism, and one is left asking more
questions than are answered. Would forbidding companies to participate in
genocide abroad constitute moral imperialism? Would forbidding companies
to engage in slavery constitute moral imperialism? Do prohibitions on the
shipments of toxic waste, or dangerous pesticides, or watered down infant
formula constitute moral imperialism? Does a requirement that companies
use the home country's accounting system to measure earnings abroad
constitute moral imperialism? 243
Professor Salbu suggests a definition of moral imperialism based on
Thomas Dunfee's and Thomas Donaldson's integrative social contract
model.' Integrative social contract theory integrates two distinct types of
social contracts.245 The first type is a hypothetical macrosocial contract
among all of the members of a given society, the contents of which are all of
the economic rules to which all of the members would agree, with the
condition that they not know the position they would occupy under the
rules. 6 Clearly, broad agreement will not generate a great number of rules;
within that hypothetical macrosocial contract, therefore, exists a moral free
space. Inside that moral free space, communities are free to enter into the
second type of social contract-explicit contracts that provide more detailed
rules concerning ethical behavior in economic life.247 These microsocial
contracts are bounded in tivo ways: first, by hypernorms, which are
"principles so fundamental to human existence that they serve as a guide in
242. See, e.g., Lenn v. Rich, 331 Mass. 104, 109 (1954) (noting that because the plaintiff's
substantive contract rights arose in France, French contract law can be considered).
243. Salbu himself offers an all-encompassing perspective of moral imperialism: "[Mioral
imperialism is an ineluctable reality whenever one sovereign entity seeks to allow or control behavior
inside the borders of another." Salbu, supra note 89, at 252. The intellectual poverty of such an
absolutist realist position was noted some time ago by David Kennedy, who posited a "fundamental
contradiction" in realism: states "cannot be both internally absolute and externally social." David
Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353, 361 (1980).
244. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 276.
245. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unfled Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. Rv. 252, 254 (1994)
(explaining the integrative social contract model).
246. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: A
Communitarian Conception of Economic Ethics, 11 ECON. & PHIL. 85, 93 (1995) (explaining the
hypothetical macrosocial contract).
247. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 245, at 260-62 (discussing moral free space);
Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 246, at 94-95 (discussing microsocial contracts).
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evaluating lower level moral norms";248 and second, by a requirement that
individual members have consented to the contract.2"9 An entity may have
membership in multiple economic communities."so
Salbu intimates that moral imperialism occurs in the area of moral free
space, when one community interferes with the ability of another community
to determine what moral rules will apply to commercial transactions within
the territory occupied by that community."' Under this construct, he too
labels prohibitions on transnational bribery as moral imperialism." Even
this more explicit charge, however, is questionable.
In the first place, Donaldson and Dunfee consider the proscription of
bribery to be a hypernorm 53 The prohibition of transnational bribery,
therefore, would not fall within the zone of moral free space, in which Salbu
finds the potential for moral imperialism.
In the second place, Donaldson and Dunfee emphasize the importance
of discussing the correct community when discussing moral free space."
Dunfee defines communities as "all coherent groupings of people capable of
generating ethical norms . . . includ[ing] a corporation, a department or
other subgroup within a corporation, a social club, an industry association, a
faculty senate, a church or synagogue, a city government, an association of
trial lawyers, and so on. "" Salbu, on the other hand, adheres to the realist
position-he defines community solely in terms of states. 6 Globalization,
248. Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 245, at 265; see also Thomas W. Dunfee, The Role of
Ethics in International Business, in BUSINESS ETHICS: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 63, 69
(Thomas W. Dunfee & Yukimasa Nagayasu eds., 1993) ("Hypernorms are defined as norms so
fundamental to human existence that they will be reflected in a convergence of religious, political, and
philosophical thought. Hypernorms thus represent core or fundamental values common to many
cultures.").
249. See Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 246, at 98. Consent can be indicated by, among
other means, not taking advantage of an opportunity to exit. See id. at 99-100.
250. See, e.g., Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 245, at 268 (suggesting this possibility with
regard to the Indian subsidiary of a hypothetical Western company).
251. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 278; Salbu, supra note 89, at 227 n.24.
252. See Salbu, supra note 9, at 278.
253. See THOMAS DUNFEE & THOMAS DONALDSON, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 20-26, on file with author)
(explicating in detail that bribery violates the hypernorms of the right to participation and of economic
efficiency).
254. Cf. Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 245, at 268-71 (outlining priority rules for
determining which community's rules apply).
255. Dunfee, supra note 248, at 68. "Thus defined, communities are groups that determine
their own membership and apply their own preferred forms of rationality." Id.
256. Professor Salbu's facile use of Marshall McLuhan's thirty-year-old concept allows Salbu
to describe current global conditions not in terms of what they are but rather in terms of what they are
not-the world is not yet McLuban's global village. See Salbu, supra note 89, at 228 n.28 (citing
MARSHALL McLuHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 63 (1967)). The fact that the
world does not yet match the global village that McLuhan described three decades ago, however,
hardly detracts from the mass of empirical evidence supporting the fact that the global economy is
becoming more integrated. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997, at 4 (1997) (providing data on increases in foreign investment); 2
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however, has made possible the creation of relationships with little regard
for national boundaries. 7 In other words, it is likely that the relevant
community with respect to transnational commercial transactions is not
coincident with national boundaries.s Prohibition of transnational bribery,
therefore, does not constitute moral imperialism. Rather, it is an attempt by
a national lawmaking assembly to give voice to or contribute to the creation
of the values of a larger community.
Finally, even if the proscription of bribery were not a hypernorm, and
even if globalization had not facilitated the creation of communities that
extend beyond national borders, Salbu's construct still does not define what
constitutes objectionable moral imperialism. The nationality principle is but
one means of extending jurisdiction beyond national borders; several other
means exist. 9 Indeed, if simply taking action within the moral free space of
another community is the sole criterion of moral imperialism, then moral
imperialism is a commonplace of everyday life. The question remains, why
is this particular form of moral imperialism so much more heinous and
objectionable than all of the others? Without a rigorous means of
differentiating the myriad ways in which different communities interact,
charges of "moral imperialism" sound ominous but have little meaning.260
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1997, at 9 (1997) (providing data on increases in
exports in the world economy).
257. See Matthews, supra note 71, at 50 (noting that globalization has led to the creation of
relationships with little regard for national boundaries).
258. Again, Professor Salbu's reference to the Navajo Nation illustrates this point nicely.
Salbu seems to describe a "them-and-us" world in which the Din6 exist in identifiable distinction from
the rest of the world. In reality, the Navajo economy, "since early Spanish contact, has been
progressively integrated into a larger world system." MICHAEL JOSEPH FRANCISCONI, KINSHIP,
CAPITALISM, CHANGE: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF THE NAVAJO, 1868-1995, at 141 (1998).
259. Other means of extending jurisdiction include the passive personality principle, the
protective principle, and the universality principle. See BROWNLIE, supra note 180, at 298-305;
SCHACHTER, supra note 180, at 245, 254, 267.
260. Similarly, in the current debate the link between prohibition of transnational bribery and
the allegedly attendant harms is not clearly drawn. Professor Salbu states that the "moral peril" of
imperialism is accompanied by a "political peril" of potential conflict leading to possible war. Salbu,
supra note 89, at 227. Salbu presents no empirical support for this assertion. Salbu relies instead on
three student notes, none of which deals with the prohibition of transnational bribery and none of
which present empirical support for the claim that extraterritorial application of law leads to war. See
id. at 226-27 nn. 23-26 (citing Derek G. Barella, Note, Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The
Extraterritorial Extension of Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J. 889, 913
(1994) (discussing labor law); Terrence Meyerhoff, Note, Multiculturalism and Language Rights in
Canada: Problems and Prospects for Equality and Unity, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 913, 1011
(1994) (discussing language rights in Canada); and Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World
Environment, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 370 (1982) (discussing environmental law)). The observations
of the eminent comparative scholar Alan Watson, on the other hand, while not precisely concerning
extraterritorial application of law, certainly argue against Salbu's assertion. Watson notes that far
from being rejected, transplanted law-which goes beyond the giving of voice to alien bribery laws
and even beyond extraterritorial application of domestic law-constitutes a rich source of growth for
the laws of various nations. See Alan Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. CoMp. L. 335,
335 (1996) ("In most places at most times borrowing is the most fruitful source of legal change.").
Regulating Transnational Bribery
Criminalization of transnational bribery simply involves a country
prohibiting its citizens and their employees from engaging in conduct in
another country that is illegal in that country, destructive, and socially
condemned. This criminalization does not constitute moral imperialism.
Indeed, it is the converse-to allow such conduct-that is morally
questionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
From an economic point of view, the world is becoming smaller. It is
now possible to enter into economic relations with little regard to national
borders. Laws, however, still hew to political demarcations. When
considering the desirability and viability of a policy choice, this disjunction
must be recognized.
The benefits of transnational economic relationships must also be
noted, highlighting the very serious harm engendered by transnational
bribery. One is to be encouraged, and the other limited, to the extent
possible. There are many tools available to do both, but one of the most
effective is criminalization of transnational bribery by the home country.
The home country need not rewrite the laws of bribery for every
country in which its citizens conduct business. A statute that simply sets out
the limits of bribery and then criminalizes any conduct within those limits
that is also prohibited by the host country will be both clear and effective.
Such a law is far more effective than simply leaving prohibition in the hands
of the host country or in the hands of transnational corporations.
Globalization and fragmentation in conjunction produce an uneven
terrain in which to make and implement policy choices. Nevertheless, until
viable institutions come into place that replace national laws with respect to
commercial transactions, national laws that give effect to both ends of
transnational transactions, such as laws that prohibit transnational bribery,
will be the most desirable policy choices.
Based on his historical analysis of often forceful insertions of law from one system into another,
including the spread of Roman law in Western Europe, Watson concludes that even laws that rely
heavily on context "may be successfully transplanted to a country with very different traditions." Alan
Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q. REv. 79, 82 (1976).
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